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Linking Patent Reform and Civil Litigation Reform 
Greg Reilly* 
Patent reform increasingly focuses on discovery.  Discovery is 
perceived as disproportionately expensive and burdensome in patent 
cases.  Excessive discovery is said to fuel so-called “patent trolls” and 
impose an unhealthy tax on innovation and competition.  These 
supposedly exceptional problems have led to exceptional patent-only 
reform proposals, such as delaying most discovery for over a year and 
reversing the seventy-five-year-old allocation of discovery costs. 
Treating patent litigation as exceptional has a siloing effect.  Patent 
reform debates ignore parallel debates over general civil litigation 
reform that raise the same arguments about disproportionately 
expensive and burdensome discovery and propose their own set of 
reforms.  This Article links patent reform to civil litigation reform, 
arguing that patent discovery is not exceptional in its costs, supposed 
effects, or causes.  Instead, patent discovery is representative of a 
subset of discovery-intensive civil cases.  The main problem with 
discovery in patent cases is not abusive tactics of “patent trolls” or 
inherent technical complexity but rather complex and open-ended 
remedial doctrines.  Doctrinal complexity is not unique to patent 
litigation. 
Pinpointing the source of patent discovery problems also suggests a 
solution—delaying costly and burdensome remedial discovery until 
after liability is established.  This solution need not be limited to patent 
cases.  Greater use of staged litigation—litigating and resolving some 
potentially case-dispositive issues before any discovery or other 
litigation occurs on more discovery-intensive issues—is a potentially 
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Orly Lobel, Michael Meurer, Lisa Ouellette, Laura Pedraza-Fariña, Dave Schwartz, Ted 
Sichelman, David Taylor, and Greg Vetter, as well as participants at Patent Conference 4, Works 
in Progress Intellectual Property 2015 at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Corporate 
Innovation and Policy seminar at University of San Diego School of Law, and University of San 
Diego School of Law IP Speakers Series, for helpful discussions and comments on this and 
earlier versions of the project. 
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valuable tool for reforming general civil litigation.  Notably, staged 
litigation preserves the plaintiff’s access to information and right to a 
jury trial, overcoming objections to other efforts to reduce civil 
litigation costs, like Twombly/Iqbal plausibility pleading. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Patent litigation is often seen as “different” from other civil litigation, 
necessitating special patent-only rules that stray from general legal 
principles even for issues arising in other contexts.1  Over the past 
decade, the Supreme Court soundly rejected this “patent 
exceptionalism,” reversing a series of patent-only procedural rules 
adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.2  
Commentators largely praised the Supreme Court’s efforts “to draw 
patent law back into the [mainstream] legal landscape.”3  Yet, in recent 
years, Congress has engaged in its own form of “patent 
exceptionalism,” debating and even passing patent-only procedures that 
depart from general civil practice in areas like joinder, pleading, fee 
shifting, and discovery.4  While the Federal Circuit’s patent-only rules 
generally enhanced the enforcement of patent rights, Congress is 
motivated by concerns about patent assertion entities—pejoratively 
known as “patent trolls”5—and its patent-only reforms restrict 
enforcement of patent rights. 
Discovery is a chief target of this new form of “patent 
exceptionalism.”  Discovery is seen as uniquely problematic in patent 
cases, with disproportionately high costs making it vulnerable to 
abusive litigation that extracts cost-motivated settlements even for weak 
claims.6  The ability to use high discovery costs to force meritless 
settlements supposedly has fueled the rise of patent assertion entities, 
which are said to burden innovation and competition.7  Arguing that 
normal discovery rules are “obsolete, or at least inappropriate, for the 
 
1. Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1791, 1817–18 (2013). 
2. Id. at 1818.  The Federal Circuit has nationwide appellate jurisdiction in patent cases. 
3. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Interest in Patent Law, 3 IP 
THEORY 62, 71–72 (2013) (explaining recent Supreme Court interest in patent law based, in part, 
on rejection of patent law exceptionalism and desire to connect patent law to other areas of law). 
4. See generally David O. Taylor, Patent Misjoinder, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 652 (2013) 
(describing patent-only joinder statute).  Congress is currently debating patent-only pleading 
requirements, fee shifting, and discovery reforms.  See infra Part I.A. 
5. The terms patent assertion entity (“PAE”), non-practicing entity (“NPE”), and patent troll 
(“troll”) all refer to patent holders that do not manufacture products but instead commercialize 
inventions through licensing or litigating patent rights.  Though the terms have slightly different 
connotations, they are often used interchangeably.  See David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, 
Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 
426 (2014) (summarizing terminology).  This Article uses the term patent assertion entity or PAE 
but it is intended to cover entities referred to as NPEs or trolls as well. 
6. See infra Part II. 
7. See infra Part II.B. 
REILLY (179-245).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2015  5:15 PM 
182 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  47 
vast complexity and volume of large patent disputes,”8 patent reformers 
propose fundamental patent-only changes to discovery, including 
delaying almost all discovery until approximately a year after filing and 
departing from the seventy-five-year-old presumption that the 
responding party bear its own discovery costs.9 
But the premise underlying these significant patent-only variations is 
largely untested.  Is discovery in patent cases fundamentally different 
from discovery in other civil litigation?  In general, litigation discovery 
is understudied by academics: “[O]n no other topic is there more 
disconnect between the academy and bar.”10  Patent discovery is no 
exception, lacking careful consideration of the problems, causes, and 
potential solutions of costly discovery in patent cases. 
This Article undertakes that task.  In doing so, it draws patent 
discovery reform back into the mainstream legal landscape by 
connecting it to debates over reform of civil discovery more generally.  
While discovery is a relatively new part of the patent reform agenda, it 
has been a target of civil litigation reformers since the 1970s.  These 
reformers have long raised the exact same concerns now motivating 
patent discovery reform: disproportionate costs, cost-motivated 
settlements, incentives to bring weak claims, and unscrupulous 
plaintiffs who leverage high discovery costs to enrich themselves at the 
expense of innovation, competition, and the American economy.11  The 
most recent iteration of civil discovery reform resulted in amendments 
to the Federal Rules Civil of Procedure—set to go into effect in 
December 2015—that emphasize proportionality in discovery.12 
Despite being motivated by the same concerns and occurring 
contemporaneously, civil discovery reform and patent reform have been 
almost entirely siloed.  Patent reform could benefit from the lessons of 
civil litigation reform.  The proposed patent reforms are largely “the 
same, generic, anti-litigation solutions” that civil litigation reformers 
have failed to pass more generally.13  Evaluating these reforms in the 
 
8. Randall R. Rader, The State of Patent Litigation, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 331, 336 (2012). 
9. See infra Part I.A. 
10. Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal But Could Be Better: The 
Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889, 892–93 (2009). 
11. See infra Parts I.B, II.B. 
12. REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES, apps. B-6 to -7 (2014) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT], http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/committee-reports/reports-judicial-conference-septem 
ber-2014. 
13. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Litigation Reform: The Courts, Congress, and the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 279, 282 (2015). 
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full context of the decades-long debate over civil litigation reform could 
avoid adoption of ineffectual or counter-productive policies rushed 
through based on the perceived need to combat the “crisis” of patent 
assertion entities or based on the self-interested lobbying of technology 
companies most commonly targeted by patent assertion entities.14  
Conversely, civil litigation reform could benefit from the data point 
provided by discovery in patent cases.  Patent litigation increasingly 
looks like other civil litigation, with a small plaintiff (the patent 
assertion entity) with limited discoverable information suing a large 
corporation with limitless discoverable information.  However, the 
plaintiff in patent litigation (the patent assertion entity) tends to be less 
sympathetic than the defendant (a technology company), the exact 
opposite of other areas that tend to drive civil litigation reform like torts 
and civil rights.  Patent litigation thus offers a way to analyze civil 
discovery problems and reforms without the normal biases and 
ideological precommitments.15 
Analyzing patent discovery in parallel with discovery in other civil 
litigation raises questions about the assumptions motivating current 
patent reform efforts.  With regard to the discovery “problem,” 
discovery costs in patent cases may seem exceptional when compared to 
the median civil case, but they are on par with other civil cases of 
similar stakes.  High discovery costs are not a patent problem but rather 
a general problem of complex, high stakes “mega cases.”16  Nor does 
the rise of patent assertion entities make patent litigation fundamentally 
different from other civil litigation.  In many ways, complaints about 
patent assertion entities echo those made about contingent-fee plaintiffs’ 
lawyers in other civil litigation, who are alleged to bring unmeritorious 
claims and use high discovery costs to “extort” cost-of-defense 
settlements.17 
Turning to the causes of problematic discovery, the abusive practices 
of patent assertion entities are often blamed for expensive and 
burdensome patent discovery.  However, available empirical evidence 
indicates that discovery costs are lower in cases brought by patent 
assertion entities.18  This is unsurprising since these cases tend to 
involve lower stakes and contingent-fee lawyers with an incentive to 
 
14. See infra Parts I.C, IV. 
15. See infra Parts I.C, IV. 
16. See infra Part II.A. 
17. See infra Part II.B. 
18. See infra Part III.A.1. 
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avoid “scorched-earth” litigation.19  Costly and expansive discovery in 
patent cases also is attributed to the inherent technical complexity of 
patent cases.  However, the technical doctrines of infringement and 
invalidity are narrow, objective inquiries not implicating knowledge, 
intent, or motivation, exactly the opposite of the normal characteristics 
of discovery-intensive issues.20  On the other hand, a major 
contributor—perhaps the major contributor—of costly and expansive 
discovery in patent cases is the remedial doctrines for determining 
damages and “willful” infringement (which provides eligibility for 
enhanced damages).  These doctrines have the hallmarks of discovery-
intensive issues: broad, open-ended, and heavily dependent on 
subjective mental states.21  Of course, patent damages and willful 
infringement doctrines are unique to patent cases.  They are, however, 
an example of broad substantive doctrines that create costly and 
expansive litigation discovery, a phenomenon that also occurs in other 
civil litigation contexts. 
Applying the lessons learned from analyzing patent discovery in 
parallel with discovery in other civil litigation, this Article proposes a 
solution to the discovery problems in patent litigation and, perhaps, civil 
litigation more generally: staged litigation.  With staged litigation, the 
merits of certain, potentially case-dispositive issues are resolved in their 
entirety before any discovery or other litigation proceeds on more 
discovery-intensive issues.  For example, if the primary source of costly 
and burdensome patent discovery is remedial complexity, then a 
promising solution is to delay discovery on remedial issues until after 
liability (infringement and noninvalidity) is established.22  Traces of 
staged litigation exist in American civil litigation, but it is largely 
overlooked and rarely used.23  
Staged litigation provides a way to reduce litigation costs while 
preserving broad substantive rights and doctrines.  The case study of 
patent discovery demonstrates that substantive legal rights and 
doctrines—like the remedial doctrines of patent law—are as much to 
blame for discovery problems as flaws in procedural mechanisms.24  
Yet, the role of substantive law has been almost entirely ignored in 
recent patent and civil litigation reform debates.  As a result, the 
 
19. See infra Part III.A.2. 
20. See infra Part III.B. 
21. See infra Part III.C. 
22. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
23. An important exception is Louis Kaplow’s recent pathbreaking work.  Louis Kaplow, 
Multistage Adjudication, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1179 (2013). 
24. See infra Part IV.A. 
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proposed reforms in both contexts are poorly tailored to the sources of 
problematic discovery because they do not account for the broad rights 
and doctrines provided by substantive law.25  By contrast, staged 
litigation accounts for broad substantive rights and doctrines, while 
reducing discovery costs, by apportioning the most expensive and 
burdensome discovery necessitated by substantive law to those cases 
where the plaintiff demonstrated some merit by prevailing on the initial 
issues.26  Importantly, staged litigation also preserves both access to the 
information necessary for the plaintiff to prove its case and the right to a 
jury trial, overcoming objections to other civil litigation reforms like 
heightened pleading requirements and lower discovery limits.27 
The Article proceeds in four Parts.  Part I describes the parallel tracks 
of patent and civil litigation reform and the divide separating them.28  
Part II analyzes the costs and consequences of broad discovery, finding 
patent litigation to be an example of a subset of complex, high-stakes 
civil cases.29  Part III addresses the causes of discovery problems, 
finding doctrinal complexity, not patent assertion entities or inherent 
technical complexity, to be the main source of patent discovery 
problems.30  Part IV then applies this analysis to discovery reform and 
makes the preliminary case for applying staged litigation in both patent 
cases and civil litigation more generally.31 
I.  PARALLEL PATENT AND CIVIL LITIGATION REFORM 
Discovery is the pretrial exchange of information between the parties.  
Pretrial discovery was “one of the most significant innovations of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” replacing a system based largely on 
surprise with one that helped narrow and clarify the issues, provide 
necessary information, and make trial predictable.32  Only “limited” and 
“modest” changes have been made to the basic discovery regime 
adopted in 1938.33  Discovery is the crucial stage of civil litigation, 
where cases are won and lost,34 but it is also blamed for the high costs 
 
25. See infra Part IV.B. 
26. See infra Part IV.C.1. 
27. See infra Part IV.C.3. 
28. See infra Part I. 
29. See infra Part II. 
30. See infra Part III. 
31. See infra Part IV. 
32. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500–01 (1947). 
33. 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2001 (3d ed. 
1998). 
34. Moss, supra note 10, at 892. 
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and problems of modern litigation.35  Discovery in patent litigation is no 
different, described as both “the most important stage” and “the most 
tedious, burdensome, and expensive part.”36  Discovery is a primary 
focus of ongoing patent and civil litigation reform efforts.  The 
following sections describe these related, but siloed, reform efforts. 
A.  Patent Reform 
Patent reform proponents suggest that “discovery in patent litigation 
[is] a special case” that makes ordinary discovery procedures “obsolete, 
or at least inappropriate, for the vast complexity and volume of large 
patent disputes.”37  They object to “disproportionally high discovery 
expenses,” with discovery costs ranging from $350,000 in lower stakes 
cases to $3 million in higher stakes cases.38  Patent plaintiffs, 
particularly patent assertion entities, purportedly have “an incentive to 
apply ‘scorched earth’ techniques to force defendants to spend an 
inordinate amount of time and energy collecting and producing volumes 
of documents that are ultimately irrelevant to the merits of the case.”39  
The volume and production costs of modern electronic communications 
and electronically stored information are said to exacerbate this 
problem.40  And the benefit from broad discovery is purportedly 
minimal, with less than 1% of documents produced in discovery used in 
patent litigation.41 
Both the Federal Circuit and federal district courts have recently 
implemented patent-only discovery reforms.  The Federal Circuit 
Advisory Council issued a model order with the goal of “streamlining e-
discovery, particularly email production” and “requiring the 
 
35. Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil 
Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 766–68 (2010). 
36. KIMBERLY A. MOORE ET AL., PATENT LITIGATION AND STRATEGY 156 (3d ed. 2008); 
Manotti L. Jenkins, Putting the Clients in a Position to Succeed, in PATENT LITIGATION AND 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: LEADING LAWYERS ON UNDERSTANDING KEY COMPONENTS OF A CASE, 
EVALUATING SETTLEMENT OPPORTUNITIES, AND PREPARING FOR TRIAL 157, 161 (2007). 
37. Rader, supra note 8, at 336; Teri B. Varndell & R. Eugene Varndell, Jr., Changes in the 
World of Patent Litigation: New Rules for Discovery and the Emergence of Patent Litigation 
Investors, 34 IDEA 205, 224 (1994). 
38. Protecting Small Businesses and Promoting Innovation by Limiting Patent Troll Abuse: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 9 (2013) [hereinafter Senate 
Hearing] (statement of Dana Rao, Vice President and Associate General Counsel of Intellectual 
Property and Litigation, Adobe Systems Incorporated); Rader, supra note 8, at 336. 
39. Innovation Act: Hearing on H.R. 3309 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 
20 (2013) [hereinafter House Hearing] (statement of Krish Gupta, Senior Vice President and 
Deputy General Counsel, EMC Corporation). 
40. H.R. REP. NO. 113-279, at 32–33 (2013). 
41. Id. at 32 n.55. 
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responsible, targeted use of e-discovery in patent cases.”42  Individual 
district courts also adopted special rules to limit e-discovery in patent 
cases.43 
In Congress, patent litigation reform, especially patent discovery 
reform, is a high priority, with over a dozen bills introduced in recent 
years.44  A package of patent litigation reforms overwhelmingly passed 
the House of Representatives in late 201345 but was blocked in the 
Senate at the last minute in spring 2014 by the leadership of the 
Democratic majority.46  With Republicans taking control of the Senate 
in January 2015, patent litigation reform was expected to pass in the 
114th Congress.47  As of June 2015, overlapping, though not identical, 
patent litigation reform bills had been approved by both the Senate and 
House Judiciary Committees (the “PATENT Act” and “Innovation 
Act,” respectively).48  Even if patent litigation reform does not pass 
during the 114th Congress, the current reform proposals certainly will 
influence subsequent proposals and reform efforts, as was true in past 
phases of patent reform.49 
 
42. FED. CIRCUIT ADVISORY COMM., AN E-DISCOVERY MODEL ORDER (2013), 
http://patentlyo.com/media/docs/2013/08/ediscovery-model-order-1.pdf. 
43. See, e.g., Randall E. Kay, District Amends Local Patent Rules, L.A. DAILY J. (Feb. 25, 
2013), http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/bc17b516-90f9-4583-a459-c17caa4d3c80/Pres 
entation/PublicationAttachment/39b3ad9f-0b6b-418b-96d0-19c1046c30d9/Kay%20DJ%20article 
%20re%20new%20patent%20local%20rules.pdf (describing model e-discovery order adopted by 
U.S. District Court for Southern District of California). 
44. Patent Progress’s Guide to Federal Patent Reform Legislation, PATENT PROGRESS, 
http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislation-guides/patent-progresss-guide-patent-
reform-legislation/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2015). 
45. Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) (as passed by House, Dec. 5, 
2013); Tom Risen, Bipartisan Innovation Act Clears House, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 6, 
2013, 11:46 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/12/06/bipartisan-innovation-act-
clears-house. 
46. Dustin Volz, Why Harry Reid Blocked Patent Reform, NAT’L J. (May 21, 2014), 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/why-harry-reid-blocked-patent-reform-20140521. 
47. See Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform 2015: Republican Agenda, PATENTLY-O (Nov. 5, 
2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/11/patent-reform-republican.html (suggesting that under 
Republican control, the question was not whether patent reform would occur, but instead how far 
it would go). 
48. PATENT Act, S. 1137, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015); Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. 
(1st Sess. 2015).  House Bill 9 was reported favorably to the House by a vote of 24–8 of the 
House Judiciary Committee on June 11, 2015.  Markup of: H.R. 9, The Innovation Act, U.S. 
HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (June 11, 2015, 10:00 AM), 
http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings?ID=2848E2C2-F705-4A03-800C-64930626A395.  
Senate Bill 1137 was reported favorably to the Senate by a 16–4 vote of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.  Gene Quinn & Steve Brachmann, Vocal Minority Cannot Keep PATENT Act from 
Passing Senate Judiciary, IPWATCHDOG (June 5, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/ 
06/05/patent-act-passing-senate-judiciary/id=58418/. 
49. Gugliuzza, supra note 13, at 282. 
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The patent litigation reforms would raise pleading standards for 
patent infringement and, most prominently, make it easier for the 
prevailing party to recover its litigation fees and expenses from the 
losing party.50  These reforms are motivated by the belief that high 
patent discovery costs incentivize patentees, especially patent assertion 
entities, to bring weak claims and accused infringers to settle even 
meritorious defenses.51 
The proposed reforms have directly addressed patent discovery in 
two ways.  First, as introduced, the House reforms would limit 
discovery before the court interpreted the scope of the patent rights 
(known as “claim construction” in patent lingo) only “to information 
necessary for the court to determine the meaning of the terms used in 
the patent claim.”52  Because claim construction is a key issue in 
virtually all patent cases and can be case dispositive,53 a discovery stay 
could prevent patent holders from using high discovery costs to extract 
settlements for nonmeritorious claims based on fanciful interpretations 
of the patent.54  On the other hand, delaying almost all discovery until 
over a year after filing (the typical time to claim construction even in 
fast jurisdictions) would be a significant, patent-only departure from 
existing discovery norms, arguably conflicting with the Federal Rules’ 
commitment to “speedy” resolution.55  Later versions of the House 
reforms adopted the Senate version of this proposal, which would also 
postpone discovery, but only pending resolution of a motion to dismiss, 
motion to transfer, or motion to sever, not pending claim construction.56 
Second, both the House and Senate reforms instruct the Judicial 
Conference of the United States to “develop rules and procedures . . . to 
address the asymmetries in discovery burdens and costs” in patent 
 
50. Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 3(b) (June 11, 2015) 
[hereinafter House Amendment], http://judiciary.house.gov/_cache/files/57d3eba8-347d-439b-ad 
b8-b384210312eb/goodla-028-xml-managers-substitute-june-9-2015.pdf (Manager’s Amendment 
#1 by Representative Goodlatte); Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to S. 1137, 114th 
Cong. § 7 (June 4, 2015) [hereinafter Senate Amendment], http://www.judiciary.senate.gov 
/imo/media/doc/S.%201137%20Managers%27%20Amendment.pdf. 
51. H.R. REP. NO. 113-279, at 18–19, 21 (2013). 
52. Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 299A (1st Sess. 2015). 
53. R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything?  Empirical Analysis 
of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
THE COMMON LAW 123, 125 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013). 
54. Letter from Sixty-One Professors to Congress in Support of Patent Reform Legislation 
(Nov. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Professors’ Letter], http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2359621. 
55. FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1) (permitting discovery as soon as the 
parties have met for their initial conference). 
56. House Amendment, supra note 50, § 3(d); Senate Amendment, supra note 50, § 5. 
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cases.57  Specifically, they suggest that the producing party should only 
bear the cost of production of so-called “core” documentary evidence 
and that the requesting party should bear the costs, including attorney’s 
fees, of additional, so-called “non-core” documentary evidence 
otherwise permitted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.58  
Ultimately, both the House and Senate reforms left the definition of 
core and non-core documentary evidence to the Judicial Conference.59 
However, a definition of core documentary evidence included in 
earlier versions of the House reforms is instructive of the type of 
proposals that the Judicial Conference would likely consider.  It 
featured many of the types of information crucial to any patent dispute, 
including documents related to the invention’s development, the 
accused product’s technical operation, and prior art (i.e., existing 
knowledge in the field used to invalidate the patent).60  However, only 
one category of core documentary evidence is directly related to 
damages issues: “documents sufficient to show profit attributable to the 
claimed invention.”61  Although unclear, this category almost certainly 
did not include the broad swath of information necessary to prove 
damages under existing law.62  As a result, under this proposal, every 
patentee filing a patent infringement claim would have to pay the 
accused infringer’s costs for a significant amount of the discovery 
required for a necessary element of a patent infringement claim. 
The proposed patent-only allocation of discovery costs would be a 
fundamental change to discovery.  “[S]ince the adoption of the Federal 
Rules in 1938, the allocation of discovery costs has been governed by 
the presumption that the party from whom the information is sought—
the producing party—must bear the expenses associated with the 
fulfillment of its opponent’s discovery requests.”63  Moreover, under the 
Federal Rules’ discovery regime, parties can obtain discovery of all 
relevant information on equal terms without imposed judgments about 
what information is more or less important.64  Because the discovery 
cost shifting would apply in every case, even to the most meritorious 
 
57. House Amendment, supra note 50, § 6(a)(2); Senate Amendment, supra note 50, § 6(a)(1). 
58. House Amendment, supra note 50, § 6; Senate Amendment, supra note 50, § 6. 
59. House Amendment, supra note 50, § 6(a)(3)(C); Senate Amendment, supra note 50, 
§ 6(a)(3). 
60. Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 296(3)(A) (1st Sess. 2015). 
61. Id. 
62. See infra Part III.C (discussing remedial complexity and discovery problems). 
63. Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the Future: Discovery Cost Allocation 
and Modern Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 773, 774 (2011). 
64. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
REILLY (179-245).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2015  5:15 PM 
190 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  47 
patentees, it arguably represents a more dramatic departure from 
ordinary civil litigation than even the Innovation Act’s general fee-
shifting provisions, which only apply to losing patentees. 
B.  Civil Litigation Reform 
Discovery may be a recent addition to the patent reform agenda, but 
for three decades, civil litigation reformers have sought to limit the 
scope and amount of discovery.65  The arguments for limiting patent 
discovery echo long-standing arguments for limiting civil discovery 
generally. 
Proponents of civil discovery reform—such as tort reform 
proponents, the business community, and ideological conservatives66—
contend that “[d]iscovery abuse continues to be a serious problem in the 
American civil justice system and is rapidly growing more 
pernicious.”67  The “costs of discovery in civil litigation” are said to be 
“too often out of proportion to the issues at stake in the litigation.”68  
Discovery costs constitute about half of all civil litigation costs; in 
higher stakes cases, they constitute 90% of total litigation costs and one-
third of the amount at stake.69  Reform proponents blame “[p]laintiffs’ 
attorneys routinely burden[ing] defendants with costly discovery 
requests and engag[ing] in open-ended fishing expeditions.”70  
Practitioners and other commentators contend that the volume and 
production costs of modern electronic communications and 
electronically stored information exacerbate this problem.71  And the 
benefit from broad discovery is purportedly minimal, with only one out 
of every 1044 pages of produced documents actually used at trial.72 
Largely endorsing these concerns, the Judicial Conference adopted 
amendments to the civil discovery rules that emphasize proportionality 
in discovery, which will go into effect, absent congressional action, in 
December 2015.73  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 currently defines 
 
65. Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 
U. PA. L. REV. 1839, 1850 (2014). 
66. Id. at 1867–71. 
67. John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation 
Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 594 (2010). 
68. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 12, at app. B-5. 
69. Moss, supra note 10, at 892. 
70. Beisner, supra note 67, at 549. 
71. Id. at 563–77. 
72. Id. at 574. 
73. The amendments also eliminate the court’s power to order discovery relevant to the 
“subject matter,” not just a claim or defense, a provision that was “virtually never used.”  Due to 
concern that it was mistakenly defining the standard for discoverable information, the 
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discoverable information as “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to 
any party’s claim or defense.”74  The amendments add the further 
requirement that it be “proportional to the needs of the case, considering 
the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in 
controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the 
parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the 
issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery 
outweighs its likely benefit.”75 
Compared to the proposed patent discovery reforms, the Federal 
Rules amendments are minor, focused on reorganization and 
reemphasis.76  Proportionality has been described as “old news” 
because the Federal Rules already require the court to “limit the 
frequency or extent of discovery” whenever “the burden or expense of 
the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”77  The reforms’ 
main effect is a subtle, though perhaps important, shift in how 
proportionality is raised.  Instead of requiring a court order to avoid 
discovery based on proportionality, the amendments allow a responding 
party to object to a discovery request as disproportional and beyond the 
scope of discoverable information, forcing the requesting party to move 
to compel to obtain the information.78  Notably, the reforms reaffirm the 
basic discovery regime in place since 1938.  While mentioning the 
existing authority “to allow discovery only on condition that the 
requesting party bear part or all of the costs of responding,” the 
amendments emphasize that “this clarification does not mean that cost-
shifting should become a common practice.  The assumption remains 
that the responding party ordinarily bears the costs of responding.”79 
The Federal Rules amendments have sparked strong opposition in the 
 
amendments replace the description of relevant information as being “reasonably calculated to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” with a statement that relevant information need not 
be admissible at trial.  The amendments make several other minor and uncontroversial changes.  
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 12, at apps. B-5 to -7, -9 to -19, -30 to -31. 
74. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
75. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 12, at app. B-5. 
76. See Jonah B. Gelbach & Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and Economics of Proportionality 
in Discovery 1–2 (Oct. 20, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Georgia Law Review 
and available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2551520) (describing amendments as “organizational 
changes”). 
77. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii); see Moss, supra note 10, at 905 (noting that the problem 
with proportionality limits on discovery is not that they are old news, but that such limits have 
never worked terribly well and appear unlikely to work well for e-discovery). 
78. Comments by Professors Helen Hershkoff et al. on Proposed Amendments to Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Feb. 5, 2014), 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-0622. 
79. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 12, at apps. B-10 to -11. 
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procedural community.80  Reform opponents point to a study by the 
Federal Judicial Center showing that discovery costs in the median civil 
case are minimal.81  They question the wisdom of “across the board 
limits on discovery” to address “the small number of complex, 
contentious, high-stakes cases where costs are high” and fear the 
amendments “are likely to undermine meaningful access to the courts 
and to impede enforcement of federal- and state-recognized substantive 
rights.”82 
C.  The Divide Between Patent and Civil Litigation Reform 
Patent reform debates generally assume, explicitly or implicitly, that 
costly and burdensome discovery is unique to patent cases, or at least 
worse than in other civil litigation.83  Despite overlap in the motivating 
problems, timing, and potential effects, only passing references have 
been made to civil discovery reform in the patent reform debates.84  
Perhaps this is because the patent academics, practitioners, and even 
defendants85 advocating for patent reform are specialists prone to 
ignoring other areas of law and viewing their specialized area as 
exceptional.86  Or it could be a conscious lobbying strategy.  Most of 
the proposed patent reforms are “the same, generic, anti-litigation 
solutions” frequently invoked and largely rejected to remedy past 
 
80. See, e.g., Comments by Professors Helen Hershkoff et al., supra note 78 (urging Judicial 
Conference to reject Federal Rules amendments because they would be “ineffectual,” “increase 
costs to litigants and the court system,” “spawn confusion and create incentives for wasteful 
discovery disputes,” “undermine meaningful access to the courts,” and “impede enforcement of 
federal- and state-recognized substantive rights”); Jay Tidmarsh, The Litigation Budget, 68 
VAND. L. REV. 855, 856 (2015), (“A controversial set of amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure will likely come into effect within six months.”). 
81. Comments by Professors Helen Hershkoff et al., supra note 78. 
82. Id. 
83. H.R. REP. NO. 113-279, at 19 (2013) (quoting witness testimony before the committee: 
“While this type of [discovery] abuse no doubt exists in other types of litigation, it may be more 
effective in patent litigation . . . .”); Rader, supra note 8, at 336 (“Patent cases, in particular, 
produce disproportionally high discovery expenses.”); Professors’ Letter, supra note 54 
(assuming costly and burdensome discovery is a problem of patent law). 
84. See Senate Hearing, supra note 38, at 19, 41 (statements of Dana Rao, Vice President and 
Associate General Counsel of Intellectual Property and Litigation, Adobe Systems, Incorporated, 
and Steve Bossone, Ph.D., Vice President, Intellectual Property, Alnylam Pharmaceuticals) 
(noting applicability of Federal Judicial Conference reforms to patent cases); see also Gugliuzza, 
supra note 13, at 282 (suggesting that general civil litigation reform may make patent reform 
unnecessary). 
85. Many corporations pushing patent discovery reforms are technology companies for whom 
patent litigation may be more common than other forms of litigation. 
86. Cf. J. Jonas Anderson, Patent Dialogue, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1095 (2014) (noting 
shortcomings of specialized courts). 
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litigation “crises” in other areas of law.87  For patent reform proponents, 
connecting patent reform to civil litigation reform could invoke the 
organized opposition, political considerations, and policy interests that 
have stymied more comprehensive civil litigation reform in recent 
decades.88  They have better prospects of success if they portray a 
problem unique to patent litigation—emphasizing the role of the 
politically and publicly unpopular “patent troll”—and propose patent-
specific reforms that purportedly have no bearing on other civil 
litigation.  Reform opponents presumably would rather deny there is 
any problem than argue that patent litigation is just one example of a 
larger problem.89 
Tunnel vision also runs in the opposite direction.  The civil discovery 
reform debates ignore the contemporaneous complaints about patent 
discovery and the accompanying legislative proposals.90  This may be 
because civil litigation reformers are simply unaware of patent reform 
or it may be because they accept claims that patent discovery is unique 
and exceptional.  Perhaps this is unsurprising, since patent litigation 
seems like a niche field, a technically complex battle between corporate 
interests with little relevance to civil rights, products liability, or the 
other types of cases that tend to drive civil litigation reform.91  On the 
other hand, for proponents of civil litigation reform, patent litigation 
offers a perfect example of high discovery costs and a vivid example of 
the purported consequences of problematic discovery: patent trolls.92  
For opponents of civil litigation reform, the patent reform proposals are 
a good example of an alternative to the “across-the-board limits” and 
 
87. Gugliuzza, supra note 13, at 282. 
88. See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 
162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 1562–67 (2014) (describing political obstacles that have prevented 
enactment of comprehensive civil litigation reform). 
89. Patent reform has not been totally ignored by organized interest groups that normally 
oppose civil litigation reform; some have blamed trial lawyers for blocking patent reform in the 
Senate.  Brian Fung, Who’s Behind the Last-Minute Push to Thwart Patent Reform?, WASH. 
POST (May 21, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/05/21/whos-
behind-the-last-minute-push-to-thwart-patent-reform/. 
90. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Rationalizing Cost Allocation in Civil Discovery 2 (Jan. 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Virginia School of Law and available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2557613) (arguing that what “may be coming 
next” for civil litigation reform is “an undoing of the producer-pays presumption itself” without 
mentioning patent reform). 
91. Cf. David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 
ALA. L. REV. 335, 346–51 (2012) (describing traditional differences between patent and other 
civil litigation). 
92. See infra Part II. 
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“untargeted amendments” they oppose.93   
This siloing of patent reform and civil litigation reform is 
problematic.  At the very least, there is a potential for knowledge 
exchange between the parallel tracks of discovery reform.  Moreover, 
for patent reform, isolation from civil litigation reform could lead to 
suboptimal policy.  Many of the patent reform proposals have already 
been vetted in the context of civil litigation reform, with input from a 
wide range of interests with different knowledge and viewpoints.94  By 
contrast, patent reform is being pushed largely by high technology 
companies that are the most popular targets of patent assertion 
entities.95  The self-interest of these companies, combined with the rush 
to combat the perceived “crisis” of patent assertion entities, could lead 
to ineffectual or counterproductive policies that would have seemed less 
appealing if evaluated in the full context of the decades-long experience 
with civil litigation reform.96 
Likewise, isolation from patent reform eliminates a valuable data 
point for civil litigation reform.  Patent litigation is now a mainstream 
part of the federal civil docket.97  The volume of patent cases is much 
greater than securities and antitrust cases, two areas that frequently 
influence civil litigation reform.98  Problems common in other civil 
litigation increasingly arise in patent litigation—including asymmetric 
possession of information between the small plaintiff (i.e., a patent 
assertion entity) and large corporate defendant.99   
Moreover, the proposed patent litigation reforms would be significant 
departures from the trans-substantive norm in procedural rules—i.e., the 
idea that the same procedures apply regardless of subject matter.100  
Therefore, the proposed reforms, their motivations, and their potential 
shortcomings would all seem to be valuable evidence in the on-going 
 
93. Comments by Professors Helen Hershkoff et al., supra note 78. 
94. For example, “loser pays” fee-shifting proposals have been proposed, debated, and 
rejected in general civil litigation reform for decades.  See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 88, at 
1562. 
95. Fung, supra note 89. 
96. Gugliuzza, supra note 13, at 292 (suggesting that the patent discovery reform proposals 
are “substantively flawed”). 
97. John R. Thomas, Into a Silver Age: U.S. Patent Law 1992–2012, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 525, 538–40 (2013). 
98. U.S. COURTS, TABLE C., U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD 
STATISTICS (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-2/federal-judicial-
caseload 
-statistics/2014/03/31. 
99. See infra Part II.A.1. 
100. See David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law, 2013 BYU 
L. REV. 1191 (discussing concept of, and debate over, trans-substantive rules). 
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debates as to whether, and to what extent, procedural design should 
abandon the trans-substantive norm. 
Finally, the civil litigation community ignores patent reform at its 
own peril.  Many of the patent reform proposals are the same 
procedures anti-litigation interests have tried, and continue to try,101 to 
implement more generally.  In fact, the present round of patent reform 
looks eerily similar to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995 (“PSLRA”), which included both heightened pleading 
requirements and discovery stays102 and was motivated by supposedly 
abusive securities litigation brought by plaintiffs’ lawyers to extort 
settlements.103  The PSLRA was passed largely due to lobbying from 
Silicon Valley technology firms—the very same interests pushing 
patent reform104—which in the 1990s argued that “they were the 
victims of too many frivolous class action securities fraud lawsuits,” 
just like they now argue that they are the victims of too many frivolous 
patent lawsuits.105  Many in the procedural community objected to the 
PSLRA as departing from generally applicable procedural rules, 
hindering access to courts, and undermining more comprehensive 
procedural development.106 
The present patent reform efforts may represent another step by anti-
litigation forces to achieve incrementally, subject area by subject area, 
reforms that they have not been able to achieve comprehensively.  
Patent reform thus could become a Trojan Horse, with radical changes 
to civil litigation quietly introduced in the patent context and then 
portrayed as unexceptional when proposed more generally.  Indeed, the 
agenda for the next round of civil litigation reform (subsequent to the 
amendments set to go into effect in December 2015) includes discussion 
of whether to adopt “requestor pays” discovery provisions, in part 
because “aspects of ‘requester pays’ are included in some legislative 
proposals dealing with ‘patent trolls’ that have been introduced in 
Congress.”107 
 
101. See Spencer, supra note 90 (manuscript at 2) (arguing that “undoing of the producer-pays 
presumption” for discovery is next on agenda for civil litigation reformers). 
102. 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b) (2012). 
103. See Carl Tobias, Reforming Common Sense Legal Reforms, 30 CONN. L. REV. 537, 550–
53 (1998) (“Congress meant for the [PSLRA] modifications to restrict the amount of abusive 
securities litigation, particularly lawsuits which are lawyer-driven or are brought to extract 
settlements.”). 
104. Fung, supra note 89. 
105. Dain C. Donelson & Robert A. Prentice, Scienter Pleading and Rule 10b-5: Empirical 
Analysis and Behavioral Implications, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 441, 449 (2012). 
106. Tobias, supra note 103, at 550–53, 564. 
107. ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AGENDA BOOK FOR MEETING OF 
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II.  COMPARING THE PROBLEMS OF PATENT AND CIVIL DISCOVERY 
Having identified the divide currently separating patent reform and 
civil litigation reform, this Part and the next Part challenge what appears 
to be driving this divide: the belief that discovery in patent cases is 
somehow different from discovery in other civil litigation.  This Part 
shows that both the costs and consequences of discovery in patent 
litigation are similar to other, similar-stakes civil cases.  Part III 
concludes that the most likely cause of patent discovery problems is 
doctrinal complexity, a problem not unique to patent law. 
A.  The Costs of Patent and Civil Discovery 
The primary justification for patent-specific discovery reform is the 
high costs and burdens of discovery in patent cases.108  Patent cases are 
notoriously expensive, and discovery is a major component of these 
costs.109  Median costs through the end of discovery are $350,000 when 
less than $1 million is at stake, $1 million when $1–10 million is at 
stake, $2 million when $10–25 million is at stake, and $3 million when 
more than $25 million is at stake.110 
Patent reform proponents emphasize the asymmetry in the 
distribution of these costs.  Because patent defendants tend to possess 
“the bulk of the relevant evidence,” they have higher discovery costs 
than the patent holder.111  Litigation brought by patent assertion entities 
probably accentuates this asymmetry.  Patent assertion entities normally 
are small operations focused just on licensing and litigation that have 
few relevant witnesses, documents, or other evidence.112 
Complaints about high discovery costs are not unique to patent 
litigation.  Many “lament the ‘twin scourges’ of the federal civil 
litigation system—namely, cost and delay—concerns that apparently 
affect other legal systems and whose existence can be traced back to 
 
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, tab 9A, at 333–38 (Apr. 9–10, 2015), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2015-
04.pdf. 
108. See supra Part I.A. 
109. Professors’ Letter, supra note 54, at 1.  Median litigation costs in patent cases range from 
$700,000 in lower stakes cases to $5.5 million in higher stakes cases.  AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. 
LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2013, at I-129 (2013) [hereinafter AIPLA]. 
110. AIPLA, supra note 109, at 35. 
111. In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Neil Bros. Ltd. v. 
World Wide Lines, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 325, 330 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)); Thomas M. Lenard, Patent 
Reform 2.0, HILL: CONGRESS BLOG (Nov. 1, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-
blog/technology/188899-patent-reform-20. 
112. H.R. REP. NO. 113-279, at 31–33 (2013). 
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ancient times.”113  This narrative of cost and delay, most often blamed 
on discovery, has driven civil litigation reform for over three 
decades.114  Asymmetric discovery costs, like those in cases brought by 
patent assertion entities, are common in civil litigation.115  The Judicial 
Conference has explained: 
One party—often an individual plaintiff—may have very little 
discoverable information.  The other party may have vast amounts of 
information, including information that can be readily retrieved and 
information that is more difficult to retrieve.  In practice these 
circumstances often mean that the burden of responding to discovery 
lies heavier on the party who has more information, and properly 
so.116 
Despite these similarities to civil discovery generally, patent reform 
proponents further argue that “[p]atent cases . . . produce 
disproportionally high discovery expenses.”117  They are unclear as to 
what the discovery costs are disproportionate to.  Total patent litigation 
costs?  General civil litigation costs?  The stakes?  The complexity?  Of 
course, the lack of “proportionality” in discovery is also the prime 
motivator of the current round of civil litigation reforms.118 
Federal Judicial Center research does suggest that intellectual 
property cases (of which patent cases are likely the most expensive) 
have 62% higher litigation costs than the baseline, even when 
controlling for a variety of factors.119  However, disproportionate 
litigation costs do not necessarily mean that patent cases have 
disproportionate discovery costs.  Patent cases could have exceptional 
 
113. Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 54 (2010). 
114. Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its 
Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1094–101 (2012). 
115. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE 
PATENT QUALITY 10 n.22 (2013) [hereinafter GAO] (“[A]symmetrical discovery demands, 
burdens, and costs are not unique to NPE patent infringement litigation.  For example, parties in 
class actions and antitrust litigation typically face the same asymmetry.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., 
The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large 
Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 891 (1987) (describing a cost differential in favor of 
plaintiffs in civil discovery because “there is relatively little to be learned from the lead 
plaintiff”). 
116. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 12, at apps. B-40 to -41. 
117. Rader, supra note 8, at 336 (emphasis added). 
118. See supra Part I.B. 
119. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., LITIGATION COSTS IN 
CIVIL CASES: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 2–3, 8 (2010), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv1. 
pdf/$file/costciv1.pdf. 
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litigation costs for reasons unrelated to discovery, such as greater use of 
expert witnesses, more extensive and voluminous summary judgment 
motions, or more complex trials.  Focusing more specifically on 
discovery costs, a comparison of practitioner responses to separate 
surveys of discovery costs in patent litigation by the American 
Intellectual Property Law Association (“AIPLA”) and in civil litigation 
by the Federal Judicial Center can help evaluate whether 
“proportionality” is a more serious problem in patent discovery than 
other civil discovery.120 
Comparing patent litigation to the median civil case suggests that 
patent discovery is unusually costly and burdensome.  In the median 
civil case, total costs were only estimated as $15,000 (for plaintiffs) to 
$20,000 (for defendants), with discovery costs constituting 20% (for 
plaintiffs) to 27% (for defendants) of total litigation costs and only 1.6% 
(for plaintiffs) to 3.3% (for defendants) of the stakes.121  In patent 
litigation, costs through the end of discovery were consistently reported 
as between 50% and 60% of total litigation costs.122  Even using the 
most conservative estimate, discovery costs in patent litigation were 
reported as at least 8% of the stakes, 250% greater than in the median 
civil case.123 
However, the stakes of the median civil case were only $160,000 (for 
plaintiffs) to $200,000 (for defendants),124 which would be an 
exceptionally low stakes patent case.125  For comparison, the AIPLA’s 
 
120. The AIPLA and Federal Judicial Center studies are the primary empirical data relied 
upon in debates over patent reform and civil litigation reform, respectively.  See, e.g., JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 12, at app. B-6 (relying on FJC survey); Mark A. Lemley & A. 
Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2162 n.187 
(2013) (relying on AIPLA survey).  The FJC survey asks for discovery costs, whereas the AIPLA 
asks for costs through the end of discovery, which would include pleadings, case investigation, 
and other preliminary matters.  This difference would increase the AIPLA costs relative to the 
FJC costs, reinforcing the point in the text that patent discovery costs are not disproportionate 
compared to civil discovery costs. 
121. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL, CASE-
BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 38–39, 43 (2009). 
122. AIPLA, supra note 109, at I-129 to -132. 
123. Id.  The AIPLA report provides a single median cost through the end of discovery for 
various ranges of stakes.  The conservative estimate relies on the median discovery costs for the 
$1–10 million range ($1 million) divided by the upper bound of the range ($10 million), or 10%, 
and the median discovery costs from the $10–25 million range ($2 million) divided by the upper 
bound of the range ($25 million), or 8%. 
124. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 121, at 42. 
125. John M. Golden, Litigation in the Middle: The Context of Patent-Infringement 
Injunctions, 92 TEX. L. REV. 2075, 2099–105 (2014) (describing patent cases with monetary 
awards of $350,000 and even $570,536 as “[patent] cases involving relatively modest monetary 
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lowest category encompassed all patent cases with less than $1 million 
at stake.126  Since the monetary stakes are the best predictor of both 
total litigation and discovery costs,127 higher stakes patent litigation 
should have significantly higher discovery costs than the lower-stakes 
median civil case. 
The 95th percentile of civil cases is more similar to patent litigation, 
with stakes in the $4–5 million range.128  In these cases, discovery costs 
were reported as 80% of total litigation costs,129 compared to the 50% 
of total costs incurred through the end of discovery in patent cases with 
$1–10 million at stake.130  Discovery costs in the 95th percentile of civil 
cases were also reported as 25-30% of the stakes.131  In patent litigation 
with similar stakes, discovery costs were reported as 20% of the 
stakes.132 
Thus, patent discovery only seems extraordinarily expensive when 
not accounting for the stakes of the litigation.  Discovery in patent 
litigation is on par with discovery in other civil litigation of similar 
stakes.  Whether discovery in high-stakes cases is properly calibrated or 
is excessive is an important, and very difficult, question.  But it is not a 
patent question.  “[T]he problem with excessive discovery is—and has 
always been—more pervasive with respect to a particular slice of ‘mega 
cases,’ approximately five to fifteen percent of the civil caseload.”133  
Patent litigation is just one example of this “small subset” of “complex, 
contentious, high stakes cases” where discovery is widely seen as 
problematic.134 
B.  The Consequences of Patent and Civil Discovery 
Patent discovery is seen as problematic not just because of the costs 
themselves but also because the consequences of these costs.  The high 
 
stakes”). 
126. AIPLA, supra note 109, at I-129 to -132. 
127. Lee & Willging, supra note 35, at 772; Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of 
Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 
525, 549–50 (1998). 
128. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 121, at 42. 
129. Id. at 38–39. 
130. AIPLA, supra note 109, at I-129 to -130. 
131. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 121, at 43. 
132. The median discovery costs in the AIPLA’s $1–10 million stakes category is $1 million.  
Assuming a relatively smooth cost curve in this category, this provides a rough estimate of the 
costs in a case at the median of the category, i.e., with $5 million at stake.  AIPLA, supra note 
109, at I-129. 
133. Subrin & Main, supra note 65, at 1850. 
134. Comments by Professors Helen Hershkoff et al., supra note 78. 
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patent discovery costs purportedly provide defendants “a strong 
incentive to fold and settle patent suits early, even when they believe the 
claims against them are meritless.”135  Patentees, especially patent 
assertion entities, consequently have incentives to bring weak claims, 
knowing that defendants will settle even nonmeritorious claims for less 
than the cost of defense.136  The asymmetry in discovery costs between 
patent assertion entities and accused infringers is said to provide patent 
assertion entities leverage in settlement discussions and incentivize 
excessive discovery requests.137  In fact, some argue that the problem of 
patent trolls “stems largely from” high discovery and other litigation 
costs.138  On this view, the push for patent-specific discovery reform is 
unsurprising.  Most commentators believe that patent assertion entities 
“impose[] substantial direct costs on high-tech innovators with little 
apparent offsetting benefit to inventors or innovators”139 and “have had 
a negative impact on innovation and economic growth.”140 
However, a vigorous debate continues on whether patent assertion 
entities are as problematic as commonly thought.141  Even assuming so, 
discovery costs may not be a significant source of this problem.  A 
variety of factors are blamed for the rise of patent assertion entities, and 
it is uncertain how much responsibility to attribute to discovery costs as 
opposed to, for example, uncertain patent scope or the potential for high 
damages awards.142  At least some patent assertion entities, so called 
“lottery ticket” trolls, are not seeking “cost of defense” settlements but 
 
135. Professors’ Letter, supra note 54, at 1. 
136. See H.R. REP. NO. 113-279, at 31–32 (2013) (suggesting that overly burdensome 
discovery requests force defendants to settle simply to avoid the costs of discovery); Professors’ 
Letter, supra note 54, at 1 (“Companies accused of infringement, thus, have a strong incentive 
[from high discovery costs] to fold and settle patent suits early, even when they believe the claims 
against them are meritless.”). 
137. H.R. REP. NO. 113-279, at 31–33. 
138. Randall R. Rader et al., Opinion, Make Patent Trolls Pay in Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 
2013, at A25. 
139. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL 
L. REV. 387, 388 (2014). 
140. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION 
AND U.S. INNOVATION 2 (2013) [hereinafter EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT]. 
141. See Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 5, at 427 (arguing that “there is little hard data, and 
much of the data that exists is mixed or inconclusive,” as to the effect of patent assertion entities); 
see also Michael J. Mazzeo et al., Do NPEs Matter?: Non-Practicing Entities and Patent 
Litigation Outcomes, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 879, 904 (2013) (arguing that whether patent 
assertion entities “are good or bad for technology innovation remains an open question” and that 
“the vertical separation of patent rights from technology embodied by PAEs could have important 
advantages”). 
142. See GAO, supra note 115, at 28–34 (discussing potential causes of rise of patent 
assertion entities litigation). 
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instead “hope[] to strike it big in court”143  Their business model does 
not depend on imposing high discovery costs on defendants. 
To be sure, some patent assertion entities do rely on high discovery 
costs.  These “bottom-feeder” trolls “are interested in quick, low-value 
settlements” and “rely on the high cost of patent litigation . . . to induce 
the parties they sue to settle for small amounts of money rather than pay 
millions to their lawyers.”144  The concern with these bottom feeder 
trolls is not settlements based on high discovery costs per se, but rather 
the merits of the claims they bring.  If these claims were meritorious, 
settlements that avoid the costs of litigation would be socially desirable, 
since litigation costs are deadweight losses.  However, the concern is 
that high discovery costs induce defendants to settle even non-
meritorious cases for less than the cost of defense.  The problem, then, 
is the result of two factors: (1) low merit claims, and (2) high discovery 
costs.  As a result, it is not illogical that those concerned with patent 
assertion entities, especially bottom-feeder trolls, seek reforms focused 
on reducing discovery costs.  Yet, discovery reforms are not well 
positioned to distinguish between low-merit and meritorious cases.  For 
example, the currently proposed discovery reforms apply equally to the 
most meritorious and the least meritorious cases.  In doing so, they 
burden even the strongest patent assertions to address a problem with 
the weakest patent assertions.  Arguably, merits-related reforms, such as 
the heightened pleading requirements and loser pays fee shifting of the 
current patent reform proposals, are better situated to address concerns 
with bottom feeder trolls.  This is because these reforms more precisely 
target weak claims, thus minimizing the spillover effects that reforms 
have on stronger claims. 
In any event, the exact same problems from high discovery costs 
associated with bottom feeder trolls are also attributed to high discovery 
costs in civil litigation generally.  The primary concern with excessive 
civil discovery is that “the time and expense defendants must devote to 
responding to voluminous discovery requests will make settlement more 
attractive” and the “risks of . . . litigation will produce unjustified 
settlements.”145  The criticisms of plaintiffs’ lawyers in general civil 
litigation, often made by those sympathetic to defense interests, echo 
criticisms of bottom-feeder trolls in the patent context.146  For example, 
 
143. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 120, at 2126. 
144. Id. 
145. Beisner, supra note 67, at 594; John G. Koeltl, Progress in the Spirit of Rule 1, 60 DUKE 
L.J. 537, 538 (2010). 
146. Plaintiffs’ lawyers from other fields have begun to represent patent assertion entities on a 
contingency fee basis.  Schwartz, supra note 91, at 363. 
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plaintiffs’ lawyers are accused of “bring[ing] unmeritorious cases” 
knowing that high litigation costs will force defendants to pay to settle 
even the weakest claims.147  Likewise, critics suggest that “contingency 
fees provide plaintiffs’ lawyers with a perverse incentive to file 
speculative claims specifically to obtain quick settlements, either 
‘nuisance settlements’ with small businesses who can little afford to pay 
for a protracted legal fight, or ‘blackmail settlements’ with large 
companies facing onerous and expensive litigation.”148  Plaintiffs’ 
lawyers are said to be “a drain on the American economy and a serious 
threat to the livelihood and lifestyle of many Americans,”149 obtaining 
huge fees with little to no benefit for the other ordinary people they 
represent.150 
Even if the discovery problems are the same in patent litigation and 
other comparable civil litigation, they arguably pose greater risks in 
patent litigation.  Patent law is sometimes seen as having a special, 
constitutionally enshrined role to promote innovation and fuel 
America’s economy.151  Patent reform proponents make dramatic 
claims about how high patent discovery costs “only serve[] as an 
unhealthy tax on innovation and open competition” that costs American 
workers jobs and American consumers new and improved products.152  
However, those in specialized fields often believe “exceptionalist 
approaches” are warranted without much normative support.153  That 
seems to be the case here.  The supposed needs of innovation now used 
to justify special patent-only procedural rules that restrict enforcement 
 
147. Koeltl, supra note 145, at 538. 
148. Steven B. Hantler et al., Is the “Crisis” in the Civil Justice System Real or Imagined?, 38 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1141 (2005). 
149. Anthony J. Sebok, Dispatches from the Tort Wars, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1465, 1466 (2007) 
(quoting CTR. FOR LEGAL POLICY, MANHATTAN INST., TRIAL LAWYERS, INC. 5 (2003)) 
(reviewing TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH (2005); WILLIAM HALTOM & 
MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS 
(2004); HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL 
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES (2004)). 
150. See Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: 
The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 114 (2006) (describing 
arguments about high attorneys’ fees and low benefits to the class members in class action 
settlements). 
151. See David O. Taylor, Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law Adjudication: Rules 
and Standards, 46 CONN. L. REV. 415, 473–80 (2013) (describing an argument for patent-special 
legal rules because of a need “to encourage investment by rational market participants in 
developing and disclosing new and useful inventions”). 
152. Rader, supra note 8, at 337; see Professors’ Letter, supra note 54, at 3. 
153. Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1818.  Those in specialized fields have an unsurprising 
tendency to view their fields as particularly important and the needs of their fields as unique, 
perhaps due to tunnel vision or a conscious or unconscious desire to bolster their own importance. 
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of patent rights were used only a few years ago to justify special patent-
only procedural rules that enhanced enforcement of patent rights.154  
This inconsistency makes the supposed needs of innovation a 
questionable basis on which to rest public policy. 
Moreover, litigation costs are always deadweight losses resulting in 
the inefficient use of resources that could be better spent on more 
socially productive activities.  There is no reason to think that resources 
misdirected to patent litigation are any more harmful to American 
businesses than resources misdirected to products liability, securities, or 
other litigation.  Civil litigation reformers use the same rhetoric of a 
“litigation tax” on American business resulting from high discovery 
costs that allegedly increases product prices, decreases wages, “hampers 
productivity and innovation,” hinders international competitiveness, and 
discourages investment in the United States.155 
In sum, discovery in patent cases may be problematic.  Its costs 
certainly are high, and its effects—including its potential relationship to 
the rise of patent assertion entities—may be significant.  However, this 
is not a patent problem but instead a civil litigation problem common to 
so-called “mega cases”—complex, high stakes, and contentious cases.  
In fact, the rise of patent assertion entities has made discovery in patent 
cases look more like discovery in other civil litigation. 
III.  COMPARING THE CAUSES OF PATENT AND CIVIL DISCOVERY 
PROBLEMS 
As explained in Part II, the costs and consequences of discovery in 
patent cases look surprisingly similar to other comparable civil cases, 
i.e., complex, high stakes, and contentious cases.  What about the causes 
of costly and expansive discovery?  If the costs and burdens of 
discovery in patent cases exist for different reasons than in other 
complex, high stakes cases, then “patent exceptionalist” discovery 
reforms may be logical.  Commentators point to two patent-specific 
causes of costly discovery—the abusive practices of patent assertion 
entities and the inherent technical complexity of patent cases.  This Part 
evaluates and questions the role of these patent-specific explanations in 
causing costly and expansive patent discovery.  It further suggests that 
complex and open-ended remedial doctrines are more likely to be a 
substantial contributor to the costs and burdens of discovery in patent 
cases.  Though these remedial doctrines themselves are unique to patent 
 
154. See Taylor, supra note 151, at 473–80 (justifying pro-patent exceptionalist rules based on 
needs of innovation). 
155. Beisner, supra note 67, at 575–76. 
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law, other areas of civil litigation have similar broad and open-ended 
substantive doctrines that contribute to costly and expansive discovery. 
A.  Patent Assertion Entities and Discovery Problems 
Patent assertion entities are blamed for most problems with the patent 
system.156  Patent discovery is no exception.  Two distinct claims are 
made about the relationship between patent assertion entities and 
discovery problems.  First, as previously discussed, patent assertion 
entities are said to exploit high discovery costs that asymmetrically fall 
on defendants to extract cost-driven settlements, even for weak 
claims.157  On this view, patent assertion entities are an effect of high 
patent discovery costs (an effect that is probably better addressed 
through merits-focused reforms, as discussed previously in Part II.B).  
Second, patent assertion entities are described as a cause of high 
discovery costs, with patent litigation brought by patent assertion 
entities said to have higher per case discovery costs than that brought by 
practicing patentees.158  Patent assertion entities purportedly have 
unique “incentive[s] to apply ‘scorched earth’ techniques to force 
defendants to spend an inordinate amount of time and energy colleting 
and producing volumes of documents that are ultimately irrelevant to 
the merits of the case.”159  The belief that patent assertion entities cause 
higher discovery costs than practicing patentees is one of the driving 
forces behind Congress’s patent-specific discovery reform proposals.160 
Even if the causal story were true, patent litigation would seem to 
mimic other comparable civil litigation in this regard.  Plaintiffs’ 
lawyers in other areas of civil litigation purportedly “routinely burden 
defendants with costly discovery requests and engage in open-ended 
fishing expeditions.”161  More importantly, the notion that patent 
assertion entities raise discovery and litigation costs compared to 
practicing patentees is empirically flawed and theoretically 
counterintuitive. 
 
156. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 120, at 2118–21. 
157. Professors’ Letter, supra note 54, at 1. 
158. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 120, at 2161 (“[T]he idea that dealing with troll 
patents is more costly than dealing with practicing entities seems to resonate with those facing 
troll suits.”). 
159. House Hearing, supra note 39, at 20. 
160. See H.R. REP. NO. 113-279, at 31–33 (2013) (discussing witnesses’ accounts of the cost 
and burden of discovery). 
161. Beisner, supra note 67, at 549. 
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1.  Empirically, Discovery Costs are Lower in Patent Assertion Entity 
Litigation 
The best available empirical evidence demonstrates that discovery 
costs are lower in cases brought by patent assertion entities.  The 
AIPLA 2013 survey for the first time distinguished costs in non-
practicing entity cases and, as shown in Table 1, costs through the end 
of discovery were consistently lower regardless of the stakes. 
 
 TABLE 1: Patent Litigation Costs Through End of Discovery Based 
on Type of Litigation162 
 
Because the AIPLA’s survey does not distinguish between patentee 
and accused infringer costs, it could obscure a different distribution of 
costs in patent assertion entity cases, with accused infringers’ costs 
higher than in cases brought by practicing patentees and patentees’ costs 
significantly lower.163  However, the most comprehensive effort to 
quantify the costs of patent assertion entities, a study by Professors 
Bessen and Meurer, looked just at the costs to defendants in patent 
assertion entity cases.  To validate their findings, Bessen and Meurer 
noted that the defendants’ direct legal costs in their survey were 
generally less than the costs through the end of discovery for all patent 
litigation in the AIPLA’s 2011 survey.164  Thus, the best empirical 
evidence suggests that it is less costly to litigate against patent assertion 
entities than practicing patentees. 
No empirical evidence suggests otherwise.  Arguments blaming high 
discovery costs on patent assertion entities often note that there was a 
dramatic rise in discovery costs—which doubled between 2001 and 
2013165—over the same time period that patent assertion entities’ share 
 
162. AIPLA, supra note 109, at 34–35. 
163. Thanks to Mark Lemley for raising this possibility with me. 
164. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 139, at 401–02 (making adjustments for likelihood of 
settlement and noting some uncertainty as to whether the AIPLA survey is reporting means or 
medians). 
165. Compare AIPLA, supra note 109, at I-129 to -131 (showing median cost of patent 
Litigation 
Type 




> $25 Million 
at Risk 




$300,000 $983,000 $2,500,000 
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of patent cases rose significantly.166  Correlation is hardly evidence of 
causation.  In the same time period, the “exponential growth of and 
reliance on electronic documents and communications” is popularly 
believed to have increased discovery costs.167  Additionally, the hourly 
billing rate of intellectual property lawyers was one and a half times 
greater in 2013 than 2001,168 accounting for a significant part of the 
increased discovery costs. 
2.  Theoretically, Discovery Costs Should Be Lower in Patent Assertion 
Entity Litigation 
The empirical evidence is hardly surprising.  The relevant differences 
between litigation brought by patent assertion entities and practicing 
patentees should decrease, not increase, the burden and cost of 
discovery in patent assertion entity cases.  First, the stakes in litigation 
brought by patent assertion entities tend to be lower than in litigation 
brought by practicing patentees.169  Unsurprisingly, “higher monetary 
stakes in the underlying litigation” are associated with higher litigation 
and discovery costs.170  Thus, discovery costs should be lower in 
comparatively lower stakes patent assertion entity litigation than in 
comparatively higher stakes practicing patentee litigation. 
Second, patent assertion entities are frequently represented by 
contingent-fee lawyers, whereas practicing patentees are normally 
 
litigation through end of discovery as $530,000 when less than $1 million at risk; $1,680,000 
when $1–25 million at risk; and $3,571,000 when more than $25 million at risk), with AM. 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2001, at 84–85 (2001) 
[hereinafter AIPLA 2001] (showing median cost of patent litigation through end of discovery as 
$250,000 when less than $1 million at risk; $797,000 when $1–25 million at risk; and $1,508,000 
when more than $25 million at risk). 
166. Professors’ Letter, supra note 54, at 1; see also EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra 
note 140, at 5 (describing the rise of patent assertion entities over past decade). 
167. FED. CIRCUIT ADVISORY COMM., supra note 42, at 2. 
168. Compare AIPLA, supra note 109, at I-8, I-129 to -131 ($350), with AIPLA 2001, supra 
note 165, at 37, 84–85 ($240). 
169. See Mazzeo et al., supra note 141, at 897–98 (finding that damages awards are not 
higher, and may be lower, in patent assertion entity cases than practicing patentee cases); Colleen 
Chien, Assistant Professor, Santa Clara Univ., Patent Assertion Entities, PowerPoint Presentation 
at FTC/DOJ Workshop on PAEs 69 (Dec. 10, 2012) (finding that 90% of patent assertion entity 
cases have total costs—settlement or judgment plus legal fees—of less than $10 million); see also 
Lemley & Melamed, supra note 120, at 2140 (“[P]atent damages—at least as classically 
understood—should be higher when practicing entities assert patents than when trolls do.”); id. at 
2143 (“[P]racticing entities often have strategic interests that lead them to seek not only 
injunctions, but also higher royalties or settlement payments than a troll would seek.”).  But see 
Bessen & Meurer, supra note 139, at 401 n.70 (claiming that “the stakes tend to be higher” in 
patent assertion entity suits, though without providing support). 
170. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 119, at 1 (litigation costs); see also Willging et al., supra 
note 127, at 549–50 (discovery costs). 
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represented by hourly fee lawyers.171  Hourly fee lawyers have 
incentives to engage in “scorched earth” litigation tactics because it 
maximizes their fees, while contingent-fee lawyers have incentives to 
keep costs down to maximize their profits.172  As a result, higher 
litigation costs are generally associated with billable hour, not 
contingency, lawyers: “Plaintiff attorneys charging by the hour reported 
costs almost 25% higher than those using other billing methods 
(primarily contingency fee), all else equal.”173  Since broad and 
aggressive discovery increases the compensation of the billable-hour 
attorneys that normally represent practicing patentees and decreases the 
compensation of contingent-fee attorneys that normally represent patent 
assertion entities, discovery costs in patent assertion entity cases should 
be lower than in practicing patentee cases. 
Those blaming discovery problems on patent assertion entities 
suggest that patent assertion entities can “propound extremely 
burdensome discovery to corporate defendants without fearing that they 
will be on the receiving end of corresponding burdens” because they do 
not have their own products that would subject them to counterclaims 
and because they have less complex business operations—and thus 
fewer witnesses and far fewer documents—to produce in discovery.174  
However, counterclaims for infringement against the patentee require a 
significant investment of time and money, and “there is a dearth of 
empirical evidence about how frequently counterclaims for patent 
infringement arise in competitor litigation.”175  Moreover, patentees 
generally have less discoverable information than accused infringers.176  
It is not clear how much greater the asymmetry is with patent assertion 
entities. 
In any event, this argument overstates how easy it is to impose high 
discovery costs simply by propounding broad discovery requests.  The 
 
171. Schwartz, supra note 91, at 356, 372, 374. 
172. Id. at 361, 366. 
173. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 119, at 6; see also Willging at al., supra note 127, at 541 
(providing evidence suggestive of higher discovery costs for billable-hour lawyers as compared to 
contingent-fee lawyers). 
174. H.R. REP. NO. 113-279, at 31 (2013) (quoting witness testimony before a hearing of the 
Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet); Professors’ Letter, supra note 
54, at 1. 
175. David L. Schwartz, On Mass Patent Aggregators, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 51, 53 n.8 
(2014); see Jan M. Conlin & Marta M. Chou, Case Strategies to Succeed in the Changing World 
of Patent Litigation, in LITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES: LEADING 
LAWYERS ON ADAPTING TO NEW TRENDS, IMPROVING COURTROOM TACTICS, AND 
UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF RECENT DECISIONS 17 (2010) (explaining the extensive pre-
filing steps that must be taken by a party making a patent assertion, including as a counterclaim). 
176. In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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two most costly aspects of discovery for responding parties are 
depositions and document production.  Depositions clearly require a 
significant expenditure by the propounding party, who must prepare and 
appear for the deposition, pay for the deposition space and court 
reporter, and normally travel to the location of the witness.  Less 
obviously, obtaining document production from the defendant in 
modern litigation also requires a significant investment by the 
requesting party.  “Under the current Rules, parties and their counsel are 
motivated to treat discovery requests and responses as merely their first 
offers in what will often be a protracted series of bargaining 
sessions.”177  The typical response to broad document requests is 
boilerplate objections and evasive and incomplete answers.  The result 
is “an iterative, multi-step ordeal, in which responses are followed by 
conferences, then amended responses, then further conferences, and so 
on.  All of this haggling and negotiation over what should largely be 
well-settled matters . . . drives up costs” for the requesting party, not 
just the responding party.178  Thus, in practice, patent assertion entities 
can propound broad discovery requests but cannot impose significant 
costs and burdens on defendants without incurring significant costs 
themselves.  As a result, their attorneys’ contingent-fee structure will 
discipline their ability to impose costs and burdens on defendants, even 
if the threat of receiving reciprocally costly and burdensome discovery 
requests does not. 
B.  Technical Complexity and Discovery Problems 
Aside from patent assertion entities, the most commonly blamed 
cause for the costs and burdens of discovery in patent cases is “[t]he 
complexity inherent in patents.”179  The Government Accountability 
Office endorsed this view, suggesting that “the technical complexity of 
patent cases leads to expansive discovery requests that are time 
consuming and expensive.”180  Likewise, Congress pointed to patent 
litigation’s “technical nature and complexity” to justify patent-specific 
discovery reform.181 
 
177. Daniel C. Girard & Todd I. Espinosa, Limiting Evasive Discovery: A Proposal for Three 
Cost-Saving Amendments to the Federal Rules, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 473, 476 (2010). 
178. Id. at 477. 
179. Varndell & Varndell, supra note 37, at 224; see also 6 PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, 
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.46[12][f] (3d ed. 2015), LEXIS (blaming expensive discovery 
in patent litigation on “the complexity of the technical issues that attend patent infringement and 
invalidity claims”). 
180. GAO, supra note 115, at 37. 
181. H.R. REP. NO. 113-279, at 19 (2013). 
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Two distinct types of activities are sometimes labeled “discovery” in 
patent litigation.  First, during fact discovery, the parties exchange 
relevant information about historical events related to the litigation—for 
example, the conception of the invention or the development of the 
product accused of infringing.  Second, during expert “discovery,” the 
parties exchange reports from, and conduct depositions of, expert 
witnesses.  “Experts play a critical role in patent litigation,”182 in 
significant part because of patent litigation’s inherent technical 
complexity.  Thus, technical complexity undoubtedly increases total 
litigation costs in patent cases, in part because of the increased need and 
importance of expert witnesses in patent litigation as compared to other 
cases.183  However, current patent reform efforts are motivated by the 
costs and burdens of fact discovery in patent cases and propose 
discovery reforms focused on fact discovery.  After a brief background 
on patent litigation for unfamiliar readers, the following sections 
suggest that technical complexity is not a particularly persuasive 
explanation for costly and expansive fact discovery in patent cases 
because the primary technical issues are surprisingly not discovery-
intensive. 
1.  Patent Discovery in Context 
Five major issues arise in most patent cases: claim construction, 
infringement, invalidity, damages, and willfulness.184  The first three 
issues constitute the technical side of patent litigation.  Claim 
construction is the interpretation of the claims at the end of the patent 
that define the legal rights.185  A patent is infringed if the product at 
issue (“accused product”) falls within the scope of the properly 
interpreted patent claim.186  A patent is invalid if it fails to satisfy the 
statutory requirements for a patent.187 
The remaining two major issues—damages and willfulness—
 
182. ETHAN HORWITZ & LISA HERSHMAN, PATENT LITIGATION: CLIENT HANDBOOK 
§ 6.01[1] (2012). 
183. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism and Patent Law Reform, 85 IND. L.J. 449, 
455 (2010) (noting that “[a]ll [patent] litigation steps are factually intensive and generally 
exorbitantly expensive,” because, among other reasons, the lawyers need experts in the relevant 
fields to explain the technology at issue to them, and subsequently to the judges and jurors).  
Additionally, as a result of technical complexity, case investigation and evaluation probably 
require more time and effort, and trials are probably longer and more complicated. 
184. Norman Beamer, The Basics of an Effective Patent Strategy, in PATENT LITIGATION AND 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 36, at 7, 9. 
185. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373–74 (1996). 
186. Id. at 374. 
187. 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2) (2012). 
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constitute the remedial part of patent litigation.  A successful patentee is 
entitled to compensatory damages for infringement in the form of lost 
profits or a reasonable royalty.188  The primary result of a finding of 
willful infringement is an award of enhanced damages—up to triple 
compensatory damages—and attorneys’ fees.189  Infringement is willful 
if “the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its 
actions constituted infringement of a valid patent” (objective prong) and 
this “was either known or so obvious that it should have been known to 
the accused infringer” (subjective prong).190  Recent developments have 
made willful infringement harder to prove, but the patentee still “usually 
claims that the accused infringer willfully infringed.”191 
Aside from these major issues, the most common secondary issue in 
patent litigation is inequitable conduct: whether the patent is 
unenforceable due to misconduct by the patent holder before the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (“Patent Office”).192  Pleading and 
substantive standards for inequitable conduct have been tightened in 
recent years, and the defense is now raised in less than 20% of patent 
cases.193  Patent defendants occasionally raise issues related to the 
inventorship or ownership of the patent.194  Defendants also sometimes 
claim patent misuse or antitrust violations.195  Finally, additional issues 
arise when the patent holder and the accused infringer had a prior 
relationship, such as whether a contract between the parties was 
breached or whether the patentee is estopped based on its prior 
representations.196 
These secondary issues can be fact-intensive, involving the 
development of the invention, the acquisition of the patent, and the 
relationship of the parties.  However, they are unlikely to significantly 
contribute to the discovery problems motivating patent reform.  Not 
only are they less common, but the patentee tends to possess the bulk of 
information relevant to these issues.  By contrast, patent reform is 
 
188. 7 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.03 (1997). 
189. 35 U.S.C. §§ 284–285; Christopher B. Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement and 
Enhanced Damages After In re Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 417, 419 (2012). 
190. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
191. William L. LaFuze et al., Willful Infringement, in PATENT LITIGATION STRATEGIES 
HANDBOOK 1153, 1154 (Barry L. Grossman & Gary M. Hoffman eds., 3d ed. 2010). 
192. HORWITZ & HERSHMAN, supra note 182, § 2.09[1][a]. 
193. Jason Rantanen, Recalibrating Our Empirical Understanding of Inequitable Conduct, 3 
IP THEORY 98, 106–08 (2013). 
194. 8 CHISUM, supra note 188, § 22.02. 
195. Tom Filarski & Heather N. Shafer, Patent Defenses, in PATENT LITIGATION STRATEGIES 
HANDBOOK, supra note 191, at 1223, 1287–301. 
196. Id. at 1302, 1305–13. 
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motivated by situations in which the accused infringer asymmetrically 
possesses the bulk of the information.197 
2.  Claim Construction and Infringement 
Claim construction is at best a trivial part of fact discovery in patent 
cases.  The parties’ subjective understandings of the claim are irrelevant 
to claim construction, which focuses on the patent itself and the publicly 
available history of the Patent Office proceedings.198  So-called 
“extrinsic evidence” of general meaning in the technical field may also 
be relevant but is disfavored by courts and rarely used by parties.199  
Even when extrinsic evidence is used, it is normally dictionary 
definitions, prior publications or patents in the field, and expert 
declarations identified and exchanged by lawyers in litigation,200 not 
evidence obtained from the parties during discovery. 
Infringement depends strictly on a comparison of the accused product 
to the requirements of the patent claim and does not require knowledge, 
intent, motivation, or any other factual information about “who did what 
and when.”201  Discovery on infringement generally requires a 
straightforward production of information on the technical 
characteristics of the accused product, i.e., what features it has and how 
it works.202  This typically requires three sources of factual information: 
(1) samples of the actual product; (2) a handful of technical documents 
that explain the structure and operation of the accused product, such as 
manuals, schematics, software code, or applications to the Food and 
Drug Administration (“FDA”) for drug approval; and (3) a deposition of 
one or more scientists or engineers familiar with the structure and 
 
197. Professors’ Letter, supra note 54, at 1. 
198. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
199. John P. Fry, Helping Clients Navigate the Unfamiliar Waters of Patent Litigation, in 
PATENT LITIGATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 36, at 39, 51. 
200. N.D. Cal. Pat. R. 4-2(b). 
201. See 5 CHISUM, supra note 188, § 16.02[2] (“One making, using or selling matter covered 
by a patent without authority of the owner infringes regardless of knowledge or intent . . . .”); F. 
SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 819–20 (5th ed. 
2011) (summarizing requirements for infringement); Richard A. Cederoth, Preparing for Patent 
Litigation, in PATENT LITIGATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 36, at 101, 104 
(“[P]atent infringement litigation is also unique in that it is not necessary to prove intent to bring 
a claim. . . .  Therefore, these cases are often based not so much on who did what and when.”). 
202. Fry, supra note 199, at 48; Edward H. Rice, A Strategic Approach to Patent Litigation, in 
PATENT LITIGATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 36, at 19, 25.  Patentees often phrase 
their requests as “all” technical documents, but courts and litigants recognize that they are limited 
to documents “sufficient to show” the technical characteristics.  See, e.g., N.D. Cal. Pat. R. 3-4(a) 
(requiring an accused infringer to produce “documentation sufficient to show the operation of any 
aspects or elements of an Accused Instrumentality”). 
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operation of the accused product.203  In-house counsel for high-tech 
companies suggest that in most cases the plaintiff’s entire infringement 
case can be built from one response to a discovery request, namely, the 
request for source code.204  Similarly, in the pharmaceutical industry, 
infringement often can be determined entirely from the materials 
submitted to the FDA.205 
Fact-intensive issues of who did what, when, and where can arise 
from the additional requirement for infringement that the accused 
product be made, used, sold, offered for sale, or imported in the United 
States during the term of the patent.206  However, accused infringers 
rarely dispute, and often stipulate to committing the relevant acts in the 
United States during the patent term.207  Fact-intensive questions also 
arise if the claim is not that the defendant directly infringed the patent, 
but rather encouraged others to infringe (“inducement”) or supplied a 
key component necessary to infringe (“contributory infringement”), 
both of which have knowledge or intent requirements.208  Still, direct 
infringement claims are the norm and indirect infringement claims are 
comparatively less common.209 
3.  Invalidity 
There are three major types of invalidity defenses: (1) failure to claim 
patentable subject matter; (2) failure to adequately disclose the 
invention; and (3) failure to adequately advance over the prior art.210  
Because patentable subject matter focuses just on the patent itself and 
the precedent interpreting the PATENT Act, it does not require 
discovery and can be resolved on the pleadings.211  Like claim 
 
203. Beamer, supra note 184, at 9.  Infringement discovery can involve highly sensitive 
technical information.  Id. at 15.  In modern litigation, most accused infringers willingly produce 
even the most sensitive technical information under an appropriate protective order.  Senate 
Hearing, supra note 38, at 9. 
204. Senate Hearing, supra note 38, at 9; see also House Hearing, supra note 39, at 32 
(statement of Kevin T. Kramer, Vice President and Deputy General Counsel Intellectual Property, 
Yahoo! Inc.). 
205. Ferring B.V. v. Watson Labs., Inc., 764 F.3d 1401, 1408–09 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
206. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
207. Cf. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) 
(identifying two steps in infringement analysis are determining meaning of claims and comparing 
claims to accused product), abrogated by FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6). 
208. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c); 5 CHISUM, supra note 188, §§ 17.03[2], 17.04[2]. 
209. Bernard Chao, Reconciling Foreign and Domestic Infringement, 80 UMKC L. REV. 607, 
610 (2012). 
210. These defenses are based on 35 U.S.C. § 101, § 112, and §§ 102–103, respectively. 
211. See, e.g., buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (affirming  
grant of motion for judgment on pleadings because patent was invalid for lack of patentable 
subject matter). 
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construction, the disclosure defenses—inadequate written description of 
the invention, failure to enable a skilled person to make and use the 
invention, and indefinite patent claims—focus on the patent document 
and perhaps background information on the knowledge and 
understanding of a skilled person in the field.  This latter information 
does not normally depend on the parties’ subjective knowledge or 
materials within their possession and instead is developed through 
expert testimony or treatises, textbooks, and articles, among other 
resources, identified by the lawyers during litigation.212 
Like infringement, the prior art defenses do not depend on the 
inventor knowing about the prior art references, deriving its invention 
from them, or intending to copy the prior art.213  Rather, the patent 
claims are compared to the prior art to determine whether all elements 
of the claim are found in a single reference (“anticipation”) or are found 
in multiple references and a skilled person in the field would have 
reason to combine those references (“obviousness”).214  This normally 
requires just the prior art itself (prior patents, articles, or products) and 
one or more depositions of engineers, scientists, or other technical 
employees familiar with the field, as well as perhaps background 
technical information from expert testimony, treatises, texts, and the 
like identified by lawyers.215  While prior art is often identified through 
expert witnesses or third-party prior art search firms, the parties’ 
document requests inevitably will ask for any potentially invalidating 
patents, articles, or products in the other party’s possession.  However, 
the scope of these requests is fairly limited, as the prior art must pre-
date the filing of the patent and either have the same features or be in 
the same or an allied field as the patented invention.216 
Invalidity can be more fact intensive in some circumstances.  
Sometimes the alleged prior art is not a previous patent or published 
scientific article but rather the claimed invention was previously in 
public use, on sale, or otherwise known to the public.217  Proving that 
 
212. See Filarski & Shafer, supra note 195, at 1252–61, 1268–80. 
213. Beamer, supra note 184, at 10. 
214. HORWITZ & HERSHMAN, supra note 182, § 2.04[1]–[5]; Filarski & Shafer, supra note 
195, at 1268–80. 
215. HORWITZ & HERSHMAN, supra note 182, §§ 2.03[2][e], 2.04[4]. 
216. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (limiting prior to what existed “before the effective filing 
date of the claimed invention”).  For obviousness, “prior art includes both references in the art in 
question and references in such allied fields as a person with ordinary skill in the art would be 
expected to examine for a solution to the problem.”  2 CHISUM, supra note 188, § 5.03[1].  This 
limitation does not apply for anticipation but anticipation requires that the prior art have the exact 
same features.  Id. § 5.03[1][a][vi]. 
217. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b). 
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the invention was used publicly, on sale, or known may require oral 
testimony from knowledgeable fact witnesses, review of advertisements 
and other marketing materials, detailed consideration of sales 
negotiations, among other options.218  However, most prior art defenses 
are based on printed publications, not prior use or sale of actual 
products.219  Also, a prima facie case of obviousness can be rebutted by 
so-called “secondary considerations,” such as commercial success, long 
felt but unresolved need, and skepticism by others in the field that the 
invention would work.220  Factual evidence, not just expert testimony, 
often will be used to establish the secondary considerations.221  But 
secondary considerations of nonobviousness play a fairly minor role in 
patent litigation.222 
4.  Technical Issues and Patent Discovery Problems 
In general, issues that are discovery intensive tend to involve open-
ended inquiries;223 implicate a large number of people, or 
“custodians”;224 require evidence in the form of emails or other 
electronic communications; depend on intent, motive, or another 
subjective state of mind; and have the potential for “smoking gun” 
evidence that warrants a comprehensive investigation.225  These 
characteristics are the exact opposite of the characteristics of an 
ordinary infringement or invalidity analysis.  Infringement and 
invalidity are both objective inquiries of limited scope: is each 
limitation of the patent claim found in the accused product (for 
 
218. HORWITZ & HERSHMAN, supra note 182, § 2.03[3]–[4]. 
219. Frequently Asked Questions About Prior Art Searches, PRIORARTSEARCH.COM, 
http://www.priorartsearch.com/faq.htm (last updated June 30, 2015). 
220. MOORE ET AL., supra note 36, at 548–49. 
221. HORWITZ & HERSHMAN, supra note 182, § 2.04[6][a]. 
222. Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight 
Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1422 (2006) (“This study 
reveals that secondary consideration evidence is rarely relevant to the non-obvious analysis in 
reported decisions.”). 
223. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817 (1982) (noting that judicial inquiry into 
subjective intent and subjective motivation often “entail broad-ranging discovery and the 
deposing of numerous persons”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery As Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 
635, 640–41 (1989) (describing open-ended, multi-factor legal inquiries as creating greatest 
discovery burden). 
224. Rader, supra note 8, at 336–38 (pointing to e-mails and large number of custodians as 
raising discovery costs). 
225. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817 (discussing judicial inquiry into subjective intent resulting in 
broad-ranging discovery); Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 53–54 
(1997) (suggesting that products liability should “make the manufacturer’s subjective state of 
mind irrelevant” to “reduce the cost of discovery” because there would be “no point in searching 
through storehouses of documents looking for the proverbial smoking gun”). 
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infringement), prior art (for anticipation and obviousness), or patent 
specification (for disclosure defenses)?  They require only the construed 
patent claims and a complete description of the accused product 
(infringement), prior art (anticipation and obviousness), or invention 
(disclosure defenses), at least in routine cases.  Subjective knowledge, 
intent, and motive are irrelevant to both infringement and invalidity.  As 
a result, there is no potential for smoking guns that would warrant 
expansive or comprehensive discovery.  Nor does either doctrine 
normally depend on historical conception, design, development, or 
manufacturing of the accused product or prior art, nor any other 
question of who did what or when.226 
Beyond just the limited breadth, technical documents are 
comparatively readily available and easy to produce.  Technical 
documents relating to the accused product or the prior art are rarely in 
the form of email or electronic communications, which are the most 
costly to search for and produce.227  To the contrary, they are often 
standardized documents (schematics, blueprints, users’ manuals, 
product and scientific research, etc.) kept together and organized by 
product in a standard way.  Thus, only a limited number of people at a 
company (“custodians,” in discovery terms) are necessary to find 
technical documentation showing the features and operation of the 
accused product or scientific and product research that may contain 
prior art.  The technical information will often be the same as what must 
be submitted or kept to comply with regulatory requirements imposed 
by the FDA, Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), or other regulatory 
bodies.228  Thus, the technical information necessary to prove 
infringement is normally easily collected and produced at little cost or 
burden. 
Notably, under the patent local rules adopted by one-third of federal 
district courts, defendants must produce “[s]ource code, specifications, 
schematics, flow charts, artwork, formulas, or other documentation 
 
226. See Cederoth, supra note 201, at 104 (“[P]atent infringement litigation is also unique in 
that it is not necessary to prove intent to bring a claim. . . .  Therefore, these cases are often based 
not so much on who did what and when.”). 
227. See House Hearing, supra note 39, at 32 (statement of Kevin T. Kramer, Vice President 
and Deputy General Counsel Intellectual Property, Yahoo! Inc.) (“[E-]mails and their attachments 
do not typically describe how our products perform or why.”). 
228. See, e.g., Ferring B.V. v. Watson Labs., Inc., 764 F.3d 1401, 1408–09 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(FDA submissions); Jeffrey I.D. Lewis & Art C. Cody, Unscrambling the Egg: Pre-Suit 
Infringement Investigations of Process and Method Patents, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 5, 34 (2002) (regulatory filings, particularly with the FDA or EPA). 
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sufficient to show the operation of any aspects or elements of an 
Accused Instrumentality” and “[a] copy or sample of the prior art” they 
rely upon at the very beginning of the case, normally within two months 
of the initial case management conference.229  These local rules were 
drafted with input from a cross-section of the patent community, 
representing both patentee and defense interests, and have been widely 
praised.230  The quick production of technical documents and prior art 
required by these widely accepted patent local rules casts further doubt 
on the role of technical complexity in creating costly and expansive 
discovery problems in patent litigation. 
Of course, in some cases, technical complexity or technical issues 
may generate high discovery costs.  This will most commonly occur 
when the nature of the defendant’s invalidity defense requires extensive 
information about development and commercialization of either the 
accused product or the patentee’s own product, such as a claim that the 
patent is invalid based on prior use or sale of the invention.  The 
preceding discussion does not deny that technical complexity or 
technical issues can contribute to high discovery costs or that in some 
cases they may be the prime contributor to high discovery costs.  
Rather, the analysis suggests that inherent technical complexity is not 
the primary cause of costly and expansive patent discovery, as is often 
suggested.  Cases where high discovery costs are driven by technical 
issues are likely to be exceptions, rather than the norm. 
 
229. Compare Infringement Production (D), LOCAL PATENT RULES: PATENT RULES MADE 
EASY, http://www.localpatentrules.com/compare-rules/infringement-production-d/ (last visited 
Sept. 13, 2015), with Invalidity Production (D), LOCAL PATENT RULES: PATENT RULES MADE 
EASY, http://www.localpatentrules.com/compare-rules/invalidity-production-d/ (last visited Sept. 
13, 2015) (showing that most patent local rules require defendant to produce “documentation 
sufficient to show the operation of any aspects or elements of an Accused Instrumentality” and a 
copy of prior art with invalidity contentions); compare Summary Charts: Infringement 
Contentions, LOCAL PATENT RULES: PATENT RULES MADE EASY, http://www.localpatentrules. 
com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Chart%20Infringement%20Contentions.pdf (last visited Sept. 
13, 2015), with Summary Charts: Invalidity Contentions, LOCAL PATENT RULES: PATENT RULES 
MADE EASY, http://www.localpatentrules.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Chart%20Invalidity 
%20Contentions.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2015) (showing that most patent local rules require 
infringement contentions to be served within fourteen to sixty days of case management 
conference and invalidity contentions to be served within thirty to sixty days of infringement 
contentions). 
230. See, e.g., Matthew F. Kennelly & Edward D. Manzo, Northern District of Illinois Adopts 
Local Patent Rules, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 202, 203–05 (2009) (describing 
support for patent local rules among local bar and clients and drafting by those who typically 
represent defendants, those who typically represent plaintiffs, and those who represent both); 
James Ware & Brian Davy, The History, Content, Application and Influence of the Northern 
District of California’s Patent Local Rules, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 
965, 1007–14 (2009) (describing how patent local rules have been “broadly applauded” and 
widely adopted). 
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C.  Remedial Complexity and Discovery Problems 
The prior sections have questioned the most common explanations 
for the high costs and burdens of discovery in patent cases: abusive 
tactics of patent assertion entities and technical complexity.  What, then, 
drives the costs and burdens of patent discovery?  A major contributor, 
and perhaps the major contributor, has been largely overlooked in patent 
reform debates and, yet, is readily apparent from careful analysis of the 
issues in patent litigation: the remedial doctrines of damages (lost 
profits or reasonable royalty) and willful infringement. 
1.  Damages 
Both lost profits and reasonable royalty damages depend on an effort 
to reconstruct the world as it would have been if the defendant had not 
infringed to determine either how many of the defendant’s sales the 
patentee would have made (lost profits) or the terms the parties would 
have agreed on if they had negotiated a license instead (reasonable 
royalty).231  Both necessarily require volumes of historical information 
about the parties, the finances, the products, the sales, and so forth.232 
The reasonable royalty inquiry is probably the most fact-intensive 
issue in patent litigation.233  It “take[s] into account every economic 
factor that the parties could have considered at the time of 
infringement.”234  Courts almost always use the “Georgia-Pacific 
factors,” which are a nonexclusive list of fifteen factors expressly 
intended to cover “a broad spectrum of other evidentiary facts probative 
of a ‘reasonable’ royalty.”235  They implicate virtually every aspect of a 
defendant’s (and patentee’s) business, including technical design; 
product development and strategy; manufacturing; pricing; sales; 
distribution networks; customers; finance; marketing and advertising; 
market, consumer, and competitive research; business and strategic 
plans; sales and market forecasts; and licensing and legal.236  The 
 
231. RICHARD F. CAULEY, WINNING THE PATENT DAMAGES CASE: A LITIGATOR’S GUIDE TO 
ECONOMIC MODELS AND OTHER DAMAGE STRATEGIES 125–26 (2d ed. 2011). 
232. Beamer, supra note 184, at 11; Barry L. Grossman, Patent Infringement Damages, in 
PATENT LITIGATION STRATEGIES HANDBOOK, supra note 191, at 1403, 1404. 
233. See John C. Jarosz & Michael J. Chapman, The Hypothetical Negotiation and 
Reasonable Royalty Damages: The Tail Wagging the Dog, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 769, 775 
(2013) (“[C]ourts have historically tended to afford litigants a substantial amount of flexibility 
regarding both the type and quantum of evidence that may be used to support a reasonable royalty 
damages determination.”) 
234. CAULEY, supra note 231, at 13. 
235. Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), 
modified, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971). 
236. CAULEY, supra note 231, at 65, 72–73, 89, 95, 98, 108–09, 122; Carolyn Blankenship & 
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Georgia-Pacific factors even justify substantial discovery into sales, 
marketing, financial, and technical documents related to products not 
accused of infringement, both to determine if other products are sold or 
used with the accused products and to highlight differences that can be 
informative of the demand for and value of the patented features.237  
Without exaggeration, the Georgia-Pacific factors justify discovery of 
virtually any aspect of an accused infringer’s business.238 
Beyond scope, reasonable royalty discovery also is broad in terms of 
people, or “custodians.”  Various people will have responsibility for the 
wide-ranging aspects of the defendant’s business relevant to the 
reasonable royalty.  It is also broad in time, covering both before 
infringement began and subsequent events that might shed light on the 
pre-infringement negotiation.239  Finally, unlike infringement and 
invalidity, e-mails and other electronic communications can be relevant 
to the reasonable royalty.  For example, e-mails may discuss or reflect 
the importance and value attributed to the patented feature as compared 
to other features, either internally or among distributors and 
customers.240 
Lost profits damages also require “substantial discovery.”241  
Specifically, lost profits require the patent holder to show both its profit 
margin and that “but for the infringer’s improper acts, [it] would have 
made greater sales, charged higher prices or incurred lower 
expenses.”242  Some of the lost profits discovery focuses exclusively on 
the patentee, including the patentee’s manufacturing and marketing 
capacity.  However, lost profits necessitate discovery into the accused 
infringer’s technical design; product development; customers; pricing; 
sales; marketing; and consumer and market research.243  In fact, to 
determine whether there are noninfringing alternatives, extensive 
discovery may be necessary into the design, technical features, 
development, marketing, sales, pricing, and customers of the accused 
infringer’s non-accused products.  All of this discovery implicates a 
large number of custodians.  Costly third-party discovery often also is 
 
Laura Stamm, Proving Patent Damages, 15 IP LITIGATOR, No. 3, May/June 2009, at 1, 3–4. 
237. CAULEY, supra note 231, at 73, 95; Blankenship & Stamm, supra note 236, at 3–4. 
238. Cf. Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating 
Reasonable Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627, 632 (2010) (“The multi-factor test makes 
it difficult for the court to exercise a gate-keeping function, because a wide range of evidence can 
be offered in support of one factor or another.”). 
239. CHISUM, supra note 188, § 20.07[3][c]. 
240. CAULEY, supra note 231, at 102–03. 
241. Id. at 134. 
242. CHISUM, supra note 188, § 20.05. 
243. CAULEY, supra note 231, at 134–35, 150–51. 
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necessary to identify alternative noninfringing products in the market 
and customer perceptions.244 
2.  Willfulness 
Willfulness raises patent discovery costs in three key ways.245  First, 
it most directly introduces discovery-intensive subjective 
considerations—like knowledge, intent, and motive—into patent 
litigation.246  This requires extensive discovery into product research, 
conception, design, and development to determine whether the accused 
infringer deliberately copied the patentee’s product, had a motive to 
harm the patentee, attempted to conceal the patent, or investigated the 
patent.247  Second, the relevant knowledge for willfulness can come 
from any of the accused infringer’s employees, not just those with 
“decision-making capacity.”248  As a result, discovery on willfulness 
implicates numerous “custodians”—virtually any of the accused 
infringer’s employees.  It also justifies comprehensive discovery to 
potentially find a buried “smoking gun” demonstrating knowledge of 
the patent.249  Third, willfulness is the primary justification for costly 
and burdensome discovery of the accused infringer’s e-mails and other 
electronic communications.250 
3.  Remedial Issues and Patent Discovery Problems 
The remedial doctrines are historical inquiries that try to recreate the 
 
244. Id. at 135. 
245. In the past, willfulness introduced difficult and contentious questions about attorney-
client privilege, work product, and the waiver thereof.  However, Federal Circuit decisions over 
the past decade have mitigated, though not eliminated, these problems.  See CHISUM, supra note 
188, § 20.03[4][b][v][L][2] (describing how recent decisions have reduced the importance of an 
advice of counsel defense and the attorney-client privilege issues that accompany it). 
246. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (“Because 
patent infringement is a strict liability offense, the nature of the offense is only relevant in 
determining whether enhanced damages are warranted.”). 
247. See Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 649 F.3d 1336, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (describing 
factors to be considered in determining whether to enhance damages for willful infringement); 
CHISUM, supra note 188, § 20.03[4][b][v][L][7] (same). 
248. Imonex Servs., Inc. v. W.H. Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner GmbH, 408 F.3d 1374, 1378 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). 
249. Josephine Benkers, Examining Proposed Legislation to Reduce the Discovery Burden in 
Patent Cases, INSIDE COUNSEL (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2014/04/02/ 
examining-proposed-legislation-to-reduce-the-disco. 
250. Noemi C. Espinosa, Tactics to Limit E-Discovery Costs in Patent Cases, LAW360 (June 
15, 2010, 10:34 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/171971/tactics-to-limit-e-discovery-costs-
in-patent-cases; see also Benkers, supra note 249 (“[A] plaintiff in a patent case—maybe a patent 
troll—might ask for many thousands of emails, in search of some smoking-gun email mentioning 
the patent-in-suit, which may be relevant to a question of willful infringement.”). 
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world, the market, and the parties as they existed before infringement 
began.251  Unlike infringement and invalidity, they are intimately 
focused on who did what and when.252  Unlike infringement and 
invalidity, the remedial doctrines are broad and open ended, 
encouraging consideration of any evidence that could shed light on the 
situation as it existed at the time infringement began.253  Not only do 
the broad and open-ended remedial doctrines increase the scope of 
discoverable information, but they also generate more opportunities for 
the parties to propound broad discovery requests and to dispute whether 
information or evidence covered by these broad requests is relevant, 
necessary, or cost justified.  The resulting discovery disputes impose 
additional costs beyond just the costs of collection and production of 
documents. 
Unlike infringement and invalidity, remedial doctrines are inherently 
subjective, focused on the parties’ knowledge, intent, and motives.254  
Unlike infringement and invalidity, a wide array of custodians in a 
company could have nonduplicative information relevant to the 
remedial doctrines, this information could be in the form of electronic 
communications, and comprehensive production is warranted by the 
potential for smoking guns.255  These characteristics are exactly what 
are normally associated with expansive and costly discovery.256 
No empirical evidence apportions discovery costs among the various 
issues in patent litigation, but remedial complexity is a theoretically 
much stronger explanation for the perceived high costs and burdens of 
 
251. CAULEY, supra note 231, at 13 (reasonable royalty); id. at 125–26 (lost profits); CHISUM, 
supra note 188, § 20.03[4][b][v][F] (willfulness). 
252. Spectralytics, 649 F.3d at 1348 (explaining that enhanced damages for willfulness 
consider “whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design of another,” “investigated 
the patent and formed a good faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed,” and 
“attempted to conceal its misconduct”); CAULEY, supra note 231, at 13 (noting that reasonable 
royalty focuses on “what the parties themselves would have agreed to”); id. at 130 (stating that 
lost profits considers actual market conditions and the actual competition between the parties). 
253. Spectralytics, 649 F.3d at 1348 (applying a totality-of-circumstances approach to 
willfulness and enhanced damages); CAULEY, supra note 231, at 13 (explaining that reasonable 
royalty provides an “opportunity to bring virtually any economic factor the parties might have 
considered to the table”); id. at 126 (“[T]he actual application of this [lost profits] remedy is 
highly complex if done correctly.”). 
254. Spectralytics, 649 F.3d at 1348 (noting that enhanced damages for willfulness considers, 
inter alia, the defendant’s knowledge, good faith belief, motivation, and deliberate copying); 
CAULEY, supra note 231, at 13 (stating that reasonable royalty “should reflect what the parties 
themselves would have agreed to”). 
255. Benkers, supra note 249 (“[A] plaintiff in a patent case . . . might ask for many thousands 
of emails, in search of some smoking-gun email mentioning the patent-in-suit, which may be 
relevant to a question of willful infringement.”). 
256. See supra Part III.C.3. 
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discovery in patent cases than those commonly identified and 
motivating patent reform efforts, namely, patent assertion entities and 
inherent technical complexity.  Although technical issues can be 
discovery intensive in some cases, discovery-intensive remedial issues 
arise in virtually all cases. 
Unlike patent assertion entities and inherent technical complexity—
which are, at least arguably, problems unique to patent litigation—
remedial complexity does not necessarily distinguish discovery in 
patent cases from other comparable civil litigation.  Of course, the 
reasonable royalty, lost profits, and willfulness doctrines themselves are 
patent-specific.  But they are just specific iterations of a more general 
phenomenon of complex and discovery-intensive doctrines also found 
in other areas of complex civil litigation.  For example, commentators 
suggest “antitrust discovery is inevitably costly and protracted” because 
under the “fact-intensive” rule-of-reason doctrine, “[t]here are few 
things about the operation of a business that would not be relevant.”257  
Similarly, the specific causation requirement in toxic tort cases can 
require costly, time-intensive, and complicated discovery.258 
IV.  REFORMING PATENT AND CIVIL DISCOVERY 
Patent discovery may not be representative of the median civil case—
the stakes and amount of discovery are significantly greater—but it is 
representative of the more complex, higher stakes, and more costly end 
of civil litigation in terms of discovery costs, effects, and causes.  This 
subset of “mega cases” is widely seen as having a pervasive problem of 
excessive discovery that may warrant discovery reforms.259  
Reconceptualizing the discovery problems in patent cases as just one 
example of a broader problem of discovery in mega cases has important 
implications for both patent reform and general civil litigation reform.  
For civil litigation reform, patent litigation offers a new data point to 
analyze the discovery problems in mega cases and their potential 
solutions. 
For patent reform, it raises questions about the need and wisdom of 
engaging in patent-only discovery reforms.  What normative basis exists 
 
257. Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1375, 1461 n. 376, 1462 (2009) (quoting Conrad M. Shumadine & Michael R. Katchmark, 
Antitrust and the Media, 917 P.L.I./PAT 393, 407 (2007)). 
258. Rachel D. Guthrie, Muddying the Waters: The Downstream Implications of Wal-Mart v. 
Dukes for Medical Monitoring Class Actions in Missouri, 7 PITT. J. ENVTL. & PUB. HEALTH L. 
305, 313, 339–40 (2013). 
259. Comments by Professors Helen Hershkoff et al., supra note 78; Subrin & Main, supra 
note 65, at 1850. 
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for addressing the mega case discovery problem only in patent cases, 
aside from the superior lobbying influence of patent constituencies like 
Silicon Valley?260  Patent-only discovery reforms depart from the 
“transsubstantive” norm that has dominated procedural rules for over a 
century, i.e., procedural rules apply equally to all cases regardless of 
substance.261  While many have questioned the continued wisdom of 
transsubstantive procedural rules, significant departures have only 
occurred in three areas—prisoners, securities, and medical 
malpractice.262  If patent discovery is comparable to discovery in other 
complex, high stakes civil cases, it is not clear why patent litigation 
should be added to this list.263  Relatedly, viewing the patent discovery 
problem as a subset of the larger mega case discovery problem suggests 
the usefulness of looking to the general civil litigation reform debate for 
both evaluation of proposed reforms and potential alternative reforms. 
This Part turns to the question of reforming discovery in mega cases 
like patent litigation, applying the lessons learned from the case study of 
patent litigation in Parts II and III.  Section A questions whether 
procedural reform is even the proper means for reform, given the role of 
broad substantive rights and doctrines in creating costly and 
burdensome discovery.  Section B turns to the specific reforms 
proposed in both patent litigation and civil litigation generally, finding 
them poorly tailored to address the problem exactly because they 
assume the problem is one just of procedure, not substantive law.  
Section C offers a more promising alternative that preserves substantive 
 
260. See Fung, supra note 89 (describing patent reform supporters as “leading tech companies 
that are often the target of patent trolls”). 
261. David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil 
Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 376, 389, 392 (2010). 
262. Id. at 372–73, 404–09. 
263. See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: 
An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
2067, 2086 (1989) (suggesting “there are reasons for Congress to proceed cautiously” in 
departing from trans-substantive procedural rules).  That Congress is the primary institution 
considering patent-specific discovery rules may mitigate concerns about the departure from the 
trans-substantive norm, because Congress has the power to engage in substantive patent reform.  
Marcus, supra note 261, at 416.  On the other hand, procedural reform may be used as a 
“backdoor vehicle” to achieve substantive reforms that would not survive the greater attention, 
more direct consideration, and more organized opposition that would accompany actual 
substantive law reform, such as an amendment to the PATENT Act that limits enforcement of 
patents to patentees that practice their invention.  See Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its 
Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
1872, 1877–78 (2006) (describing how procedural mechanisms are often used as a vehicle to 
reform substantive law without actual substantive reform legislation); see also Subrin & Main, 
supra note 65, at 1869 (describing procedural reform as “Plan B” when substantive reforms 
failed). 
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rights and doctrines while reducing discovery costs and burdens: staging 
litigation to resolve potentially case-dispositive issues before any 
discovery or other litigation occurs on more discovery-intensive issues. 
A.  A “Problem” of Substantive Law, Not Procedure? 
A key driver of the costs and burdens of patent discovery is not the 
parties, the procedures, or the facts (i.e., technical complexity), but 
rather the law and, in particular, the remedial doctrines that make such a 
wide swath of information relevant.  This provides an important 
reminder of the general contribution of substantive rights and doctrines 
to high discovery and litigation costs.  Some commentators have 
recognized as much.  For example, Professor Arthur Miller noted 
several decades ago that recognition of new substantive rights and 
expansion of substantive doctrines in the 1960s and 1970s, not the class 
action procedure, was to blame “for the increased burdens associated 
with new patterns of complex litigation.”264  Twenty-five years ago, 
Judge Frank Easterbrook blamed the costs and burdens of discovery on 
“[m]ulti-factor standards” that provide “no rule of decision but only an 
injunction to consider everything that turns out to matter.”265  And 
specific substantive doctrines have occasionally been blamed for high 
discovery and litigation costs in specific substantive areas.266 
Yet, this point has been drowned out by the loud crowd blaming 
procedural rules and devices for high discovery and litigation costs.267  
For example, civil litigation reformers see the problems as lying solely 
with procedure, such as “the failure of procedural rules to adequately 
limit the scope and amount of discovery permitted.”268  Similarly, 
patent reformers focus on alleged “misuse of various patent-
enforcement mechanisms” and “patent-litigation abuses.”269  The role 
of substantive rights and doctrines is ignored or glossed over in these 
accounts.  Perhaps this is unsurprising—reform proponents know that 
 
264. Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the 
“Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 670–76 (1979). 
265. Easterbrook, supra note 223, at 640–41, 643–44. 
266. Stucke, supra note 257, at 1461–62 (rule of reason in antitrust). 
267. Lee & Willging, supra note 35, at 782–83 (“Has the case for wide-ranging reform of the 
discovery rules been made?  The argument is being made insistently, for sure.”). 
268. Beisner, supra note 67, at 551–52 (blaming, in addition, the lack of fee shifting, 
adversarial system, malpractice law, and absence of judicial case management); see also 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 12, at app. B-5 (noting that proponents blame 
discovery problems on the fact “the proportionality factors currently found in Rule 
26(b)(2)(C)(iii) often are overlooked by courts and litigants” and relocating them “will help 
achieve the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action”). 
269. H.R. REP. NO. 113-279, at 18–19 (2013). 
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procedural reform is less visible and less likely to generate opposition 
than substantive law reform.270  Reform opponents generally favor the 
broad substantive rights and doctrines and therefore have little incentive 
to connect high discovery and litigation costs to these rights and 
doctrines. 
The patent litigation case study provides concrete evidence of how 
broad substantive law can, and does, generate high discovery and 
litigation costs.  What this means for reform is less clear.  Perhaps the 
broad substantive rights and doctrines serve important substantive 
functions that we are unwilling to disturb.  For example, in patent 
litigation, the Georgia-Pacific factors are said to use sound economic 
principles to provide a precise estimate of what constitutes a 
“reasonable royalty” under the statute,271 while the willful infringement 
doctrine can be theoretically justified as a deterrent that encourages ex 
ante licensing.272  High discovery and litigation costs may be the 
inevitable price necessary for achieving the objectives served by broad 
substantive rights and doctrines. 
On the other hand, perhaps the value of the broad substantive rights 
and doctrines are not worth their costs.273  For example, the Georgia-
Pacific factors have been derided for their openendedness, which 
creates unpredictability and conflict, offers no practical guidance to a 
jury, fails to discipline party or expert arguments, hinders judicial 
oversight, and ultimately leads to imprecision and overcompensation.274  
Likewise, the willful infringement doctrine is said to chill socially 
desirable behavior, encourage overly generous settlements, or, 
conversely, discourage settlement by increasing divergence in the 
parties’ positions.275  Commentators propose reforming276 or even 
 
270. Cf. Burbank & Farhang, supra note 88, at 1582 (“When the Court is engaged in 
apparently procedural and legalistic decisionmaking, the public perceives it as more objective, 
neutral, and legitimate.  Indeed, the public is less likely to notice such decisions at all.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
271. CAULEY, supra note 231, at 12–13. 
272. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (describing the 
purpose of willfulness, in part, as “an economic deterrent to the tort of infringement”). 
273. Easterbrook, supra note 223, at 643. 
274. Durie & Lemley, supra note 238, at 631–32; Jarosz & Chapman, supra note 233, at 783; 
Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 655, 665–67 (2009). 
275. See Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 
517, 568–69 (2014) (arguing that current willfulness doctrine “ill-advisedly eradicate[s] some 
third-party activity that would otherwise serve a salutary purpose”).  See generally Samuel Chase 
Means, Note, The Trouble with Treble Damages: Ditching Patent Law’s Willful Infringement 
Doctrine and Enhanced Damages, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1999 (summarizing literature). 
276. Durie & Lemley, supra note 238, at 643–44 (reasonable royalties); Means, supra note 
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abandoning277 both doctrines, given their questionable value.  However, 
commentators largely overlook the discovery and litigation costs that 
broad patent remedial doctrines impose.278  Appreciating the role of 
remedial patent doctrines in generating high discovery and litigation 
costs is crucial to an accurate determination of whether these doctrines 
are cost justified or should be reformed or abandoned.  More generally, 
linking substantive rights and doctrines to high discovery and litigation 
costs is vital to determining whether the expansion of legal rights and 
doctrines in recent decades is warranted or has gone too far.  This is a 
debate for substantive legal reform, not procedural reform. 
B.  The Shortcomings of Current Reform Proposals 
Turning to the present round of civil litigation and patent reforms, the 
specific reforms proposed may not be optimal for combatting discovery 
problems in patent litigation and other mega cases exactly because they 
treat the problem as one exclusively of procedure and ignore the role of 
broad modern substantive rights and doctrines. 
The amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set to go 
into effect in December 2015 provide that discovery must be 
“proportional to the needs of the case.”279  However, among the factors 
considered in determining whether discovery is proportional is “the 
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.”280  The broader the 
substantive rights and doctrines involved in a case, the broader the 
scope of discovery that will be important to resolving the issues.  Put 
another way, if broad modern substantive rights and doctrines are a 
significant contributor to high discovery and litigation costs, then a 
proportionality requirement is a questionable means for reducing 
discovery and litigation costs because broad discovery will be 
proportional to broad substantive rights and doctrines. 
Analysis of the proposed patent-only discovery reforms is more 
complicated.  The most significant patent discovery reform would 
require the requesting party to pay for production of so-called “non-
 
275, at 2022–35 (summarizing literature on willful infringement). 
277. Sichelman, supra note 275, at 567 (proposing damages approach that would focus 
directly on innovation incentives); Means, supra note 275, at 2022–35 (summarizing literature on 
willful infringement). 
278. Commentators sometimes point to the additional complication and costs the willfulness 
doctrine imposes on trials.  See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Empirical Statistics on Willful Patent 
Infringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 227, 235 (2004) (“[B]ifurcating [trials] actually saves money and 
time—in short, it is more efficient.”).  However, the discovery costs generated by the doctrine are 
likely to be far more significant, since so few cases go to trial. 
279. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 12, at app. B-30. 
280. Id. 
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core” documents, and the assumption seems to be that most of the 
information required to establish damages under existing doctrines 
would constitute non-core documents.281  Indirectly, or perhaps 
inadvertently, this provision targets patent discovery reform at the right 
problem, broad remedial doctrines.  But it does so for the wrong reason, 
apparently under the belief that this remedial discovery is not necessary 
and is sought solely for harassment purposes.  For example, one witness 
testified at a hearing before the House of Representatives: 
In a patent case, very few documents are relevant to the core issues in 
the case.  Such documents are ones that bear on the patentee’s 
ownership, any prior art known to either party, and technical 
documents sufficient to show how the accused features work at the 
level of detail addressed by the claims.  Documents beyond this tend 
to be both irrelevant and expensive to produce.282 
While remedial discovery may be “expensive to produce,” it is 
certainly not “irrelevant.”  To the contrary, it is necessary to prove 
damages and willful infringement under the governing doctrines 
adopted by the PATENT Act and the Federal Circuit.  Although 
motivated by patent assertion entities’ purported use of high discovery 
costs to extort settlements even for nonmeritorious claims, the “core” 
and “non-core” discovery provisions extends more broadly to require all 
requesting parties to pay for the non-core documents.  As a 
consequence, even the patentees with the most meritorious claims will 
have to pay for discovery that is relevant and necessary to crucial 
elements of their patent infringement claims.  This represents a 
fundamental departure from the American discovery system that has 
existed since 1938.283  There is also a risk that the increased costs will 
screen out meritorious patent claims along with nonmeritorious claims 
and deny effective access to courts to enforce valid and infringed patent 
rights.284 
The other major discovery reform proposed—staying almost all 
discovery until after the court issues its claim construction order—was 
more promising.  In effect, it would delay most discovery until nearly a 
year into the case, including the costly and expansive remedial 
 
281. See supra Part II.A. 
282. House Hearing, supra note 39, at 21. 
283. See Redish & McNamara, supra note 63, at 774 (“[S]ince the adoption of the Federal 
Rules in 1938, the allocation of discovery costs has been governed by the presumption that the 
party from whom the information is sought—the producing party—must bear the expenses 
associated with the fulfillment of its opponent’s discovery requests.”). 
284. Cf. A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A Response to Twiqbal 
Apologists, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1710, 1732 (2013) (raising similar concerns with heightened 
pleading requirements for civil litigation generally). 
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discovery.  More importantly, it would require an initial determination 
on merits issues—the meaning and scope of the patent claims—before 
permitting the expensive and burdensome discovery on remedial issues.  
Although claim construction does not directly resolve liability issues, it 
substantially influences the outcome of infringement and invalidity 
issues and can be effectively case dispositive.285  Delaying most 
discovery until after claim construction would save significant 
discovery costs in those cases where claim construction proves 
effectively case-dispositive.  And, significantly, it would save costly 
and expansive discovery for cases that had at least some merit, i.e., 
enough merit to remain viable after the meaning and the scope of the 
patent claims are determined.  In this way, the stay of discovery pending 
claim construction was an attractive reform that bears significant 
resemblance to the reforms proposed in the next section.  Unfortunately, 
it was abandoned in both the House and Senate reforms. 
On the other hand, the proposed claim construction stay might not 
have been optimal, both because it was too broad and too narrow.  The 
stay was too broad because it included technical discovery within the 
stay.  However, technical discovery is relatively limited, cheap, and 
easily produced at early stages in the case.286  The limited costs of 
allowing pre-claim construction technical discovery are likely 
outweighed by the potential benefits, including providing context that 
sharpens and narrows claim construction disputes287 and allowing the 
case to proceed expeditiously after claim construction.  The discovery 
stay was too narrow because it would only delay expensive and 
burdensome remedial discovery until after claim construction.  Delaying 
remedial discovery until after liability (infringement and noninvalidity) 
is established would offer greater cost savings without any significant 
downside, as explained below.288 
C.  A More Promising Alternative: Staging Litigation 
The prior sections lead to an important question: is it possible to 
reduce the high costs and burdens of discovery, at least in mega cases, 
while preserving broad modern substantive rights and doctrines and not 
denying or hindering access to courts for meritorious claims?  The case 
study of patent litigation in Parts II and III suggests that the answer can 
 
285. See supra Part I.A. 
286. See supra Part III.C. 
287. See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 442 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006) (noting that “information about the accused products” provides “context for accurate 
claim construction”). 
288. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
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be yes.  The liability issues of infringement and invalidity are not 
particularly discovery-intensive and the remedial doctrines of damages 
and willful infringement are largely to blame for the high costs and 
burdens of patent discovery.  This apportionment of discovery costs 
suggests a useful means for preserving substantive rights and doctrines, 
reducing costs, and targeting cost reductions at the least meritorious 
claims: delaying discovery (and other litigation activities) on remedial 
issues until after liability is established.  This type of staging289 of 
litigation could be beneficial beyond patent cases.  Other areas of law, 
particularly those that produce mega cases, may also have potentially 
dispositive issues that can be separated from discovery-intensive issues 
and resolved first, thereby eliminating the most intensive discovery in 
some cases and limiting it to the more meritorious cases.290 
The following subsections sketch the argument for staged litigation, 
describing its potential benefits and the traces of staged litigation that 
already exist in civil litigation; its application to patent litigation; its 
potential application in civil litigation more generally; and potential 
counterarguments and obstacles to implementing staged litigation.  The 
purpose is to identify staged litigation’s promise in addressing discovery 
problems in patent litigation and other mega cases, not to conclusively 
determine that staged litigation is the only means for addressing 
discovery problems or even the optimal way of doing so. 
1.  The Case for Staged Litigation 
Staged litigation, as used herein, is conceptually straightforward: 
certain potentially case-dispositive issues are separated and litigated 
first, with discovery and resolution (by summary judgment, trial, or 
 
289. I prefer the term “staging” to “bifurcating” because bifurcating suggests two phases when 
more may be optimal and bifurcating is already associated with phased trials, whereas staged 
litigation phases the entire case, including discovery. 
290. See, e.g., Janet L. McDavid, Using Alternative Dispute Resolution in Antitrust Cases, 4 
ANTITRUST 25, 27 (1990) (noting that in antitrust cases “[d]iscovery could be limited to particular 
issues (e.g., market definition and market power, existence of conspiracy, causation)” and those 
issues are resolved before the remainder of discovery occurs); Don Zupanec, Bifurcating 
Discovery—Summary Judgment Motion, 25 FED. LITIGATOR 1, 12 (2010) (describing staged 
litigation between liability and damages in bankruptcy core proceedings context); Cassandra 
Feeney, Note, Are You “In Good Hands”?: Balancing Protection for Insurers and Insured in 
First-Party Bad-Faith Claims with a Uniform Standard, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 685, 699–701 
(2011) (discussing staying insurance litigation on bad-faith issue until breach of contract issue is 
resolved); see also, e.g., Harris v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 261 F.R.D. 98, 111 (D.S.C. 2009) 
(ordering discovery and resolution of class certification issues to occur before discovery and 
resolution of merits issues); Caudle v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 
273, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (staging litigation to limit discovery to whether plaintiff suffered 
compensable injury until that issue was resolved). 
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other means) on those issues occurring before any discovery, resolution, 
or other litigation activities occur on other issues.  Preferably, the most 
discovery-intensive issues would be saved for the latter stages of 
litigation, so that the most costly and burdensome discovery only occurs 
once the plaintiff’s claim has been found meritorious on the initial 
issues. 
Staged litigation has significant potential benefits.  Staging litigation 
can reduce the total (cumulative) costs of discovery by eliminating the 
most expensive and burdensome discovery in cases that are resolved in 
favor of the defendant during the first, potentially case-dispositive, 
stage.  Staged litigation also would improve the distribution of 
discovery costs by apportioning the most expensive and most 
burdensome discovery to the more meritorious cases, i.e., those where 
the plaintiff has prevailed in the early stage issues.  By reducing and 
better apportioning discovery costs, staged litigation reduces 
defendants’ incentives to settle even meritorious claims and, 
consequently, reduces plaintiffs’ incentives to bring weak claims in the 
hope of obtaining cost-of-defense settlements.291  Instead, defendants 
can make a smaller investment in the first stage of discovery in order to 
get a merits resolution on at least one potentially case-dispositive issue.  
 
291. In the leading article on bifurcated trials, Professor William Landes agrees that 
bifurcation reduces per-case litigation costs but argues that this will not necessarily reduce the 
aggregate costs of litigation because the lower per-case litigation costs will encourage more 
plaintiffs to sue and will discourage settlements.  William M. Landes, Sequential Versus Unitary 
Trials: An Economic Analysis, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 99, 100–01 (1993).  Even assuming this 
analysis would hold true for staged litigation, staged litigation may still be optimal.  To the extent 
the encouraged plaintiffs have meritorious claims, the increased viability of suit from decreased 
per-case costs is socially desirable, since procedure seeks to faithfully implement substantive law 
in the most efficient way, not simply reduce costs.  See Nagareda, supra note 263, at 1874–78 
(judging procedural mechanisms based on whether they would further or interfere with the 
underlying remedial scheme).  Similarly, a major concern in patent litigation and other mega 
cases is that litigation costs are encouraging too many settlements, especially settlements of 
nonmeritorious claims.  Moreover, Professor Landes makes two assumptions that do not appear 
to hold in mega cases.  First, Professor Landes “eliminates the possibility of suits that have a 
negative expected value to the plaintiff but are brought to extract a settlement.”  Landes, supra, at 
102 n.8.  Second, he assumes that the parties and different phases all have equal costs.  Drury 
Stevenson, Reverse Bifurcation, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 213, 233 (2006).  While the second 
assumption may be logical for trial—where each side must put on fairly equal cases—it does not 
hold for discovery in both patent litigation (since the rise of patent assertion entities) and other 
mega cases (where the prototypical case is individual plaintiffs with limited information suing a 
corporate defendant with infinite information).  In these cases, discovery costs will often be 
imbalanced in favor of the plaintiff.  Indeed, this is exactly the reason that cost-of-defense 
settlement cases can be brought in these areas.  Thus, the benefit of the reduction in per-case costs 
in patent litigation and other mega cases will often benefit the defendant more than the plaintiff.  
Presumably, this will reduce the plaintiff’s incentives to file suit, especially for nonmeritorious 
cases where the primary goal is a settlement based on the defendant’s high litigation costs. 
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This makes it more likely that settlements will reflect the merits of the 
claim, not the costs of litigation. 
Importantly, however, staged litigation reduces costs and improves 
the distribution of costs while still preserving other values deemed 
important to American litigation, like access to courts, information, and 
jury trials.292  The plaintiff is still entitled to discover all the information 
necessary to prove the merits of its claim and to have its claim 
adjudicated by a jury of its peers (if appropriate).  However, the 
discovery and jury trials occur in phases as the plaintiff establishes the 
merits of its claims on some issues, rather than all at once as in unitary 
litigation. 
Although this description of staged litigation bears resemblance to 
the “more sequential process for developing evidence” that 
characterizes many civil law or continental legal systems,293 staged 
litigation lurks on the fringes of American litigation.  It occurs 
occasionally in American courts but only in a sporadic, case-by-case, 
and unprincipled way.294  Although practitioners, scholars, and policy 
makers have discussed at length splitting trials into different phases,295 
they have largely overlooked the possibility of staging litigation in its 
entirety, such that discovery, resolution, and other litigation activities 
occur completely for some issues before any activities occur for other 
issues.296 
 
292. Cf. Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the 
Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 360 (2013) 
(“Only the dissenting Justices [in Twombly and Iqbal] paid attention to the possibility that there 
were procedural pathways other than heightened pleading that might ameliorate these concerns 
[of high costs, frivolous litigation, and extorted settlements] and that institutional and societal 
values also were at stake.”).  Professor Warren Schwartz recognized this potential nearly fifty 
years ago, arguing that more efficient litigation was necessary and that staged litigation was 
superior to limiting discovery or substituting summary disposition for trial.  Warren F. Schwartz, 
Severance—A Means of Minimizing the Role of Burden and Expense in Determining the Outcome 
of Litigation, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1197, 1197–98 (1967).  In the intervening years, Professor 
Schwartz’s superior solution has all but disappeared from discourse, while his inferior solutions 
have come to pass. 
293. Kaplow, supra note 23, at 1186, 1222. 
294. Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 218 F.R.D. 387, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
295. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
296. Kaplow, supra note 23, at 1186 (“Nor has there been much attention to the optimal 
structure of multistage adjudication: when to have distinct stages, how many, what issues and 
evidence to consider at each, and in what order.”).  Aside from Louis Kaplow’s recent article 
discussed in the text, the most extensive academic treatment of the issue appears to be an article 
from the 1960s.  See Schwartz, supra note 292, at 1197–98 (analyzing and endorsing “severance” 
of issues with discovery and trial on some issues occurring before others).  More recently, the 
issue has received occasional passing reference in debates over modern litigation reform.  See 
Richard A. Epstein, Of Pleading and Discovery: Reflections on Twombly and Iqbal with Special 
Reference to Antitrust, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 187, 206 (offering a brief discussion of “stagger[ing] 
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The important exception is Professor Louis Kaplow’s recent 
pathbreaking article Multistage Adjudication, which takes a 
comprehensive and detailed look at multistage decision making—
whether to terminate investigation or to continue to a next stage 
involving additional expenditures that generate further information—
with a particular focus on American civil litigation.297  Although 
Kaplow’s primary interest is in how decision makers should make the 
preliminary or early stage decision, he also considers how to structure 
multistage adjudication, including when to have distinct stages, what 
issues and evidence to consider at each stage, and in what order.298 
Although Kaplow is careful to emphasize that these questions are 
context specific and dependent on difficult empirical questions, his 
analysis is broadly supportive of the concept of staged litigation 
proposed here.  Specifically, he suggests that determining whether 
staging litigation is optimal requires primarily a balance of the 
likelihood that the information at the first stage will justify termination 
(“diagnosticity”), the size of the cost savings from not having to incur 
the later stages (“cost”), and the extent of duplication of efforts if later 
stages do occur (“synergy costs”).299  Further, he suggests that a “step 
with a higher diagnosticity/cost ratio” should occur before other steps in 
the litigation.300  The concept of staged litigation advanced here—
litigating potentially case-dispositive and more discovery-intensive 
issues first—largely tracks these guideposts offered by Kaplow. 
2.  Staged Litigation v. Trial Bifurcation 
Unlike staged litigation, trial bifurcation, has been the subject of 
voluminous analysis.301  The key difference between staged litigation 
and bifurcated trials is the amount of litigation activities that are phased.  
Bifurcated trials separate issues for separate trials—often a trial on 
liability followed by a trial on damages—with the latter trial(s) 
unnecessary if the defendant prevails in the earlier phase(s).  Trial 
bifurcation normally occurs without any additional phasing of discovery 
or other litigation activities.302  Thus, litigation is unitary until the point 
 
the discovery load so that the initial round of discovery covers those targeted points of 
controversy that are most salient to the litigation in question”); Miller, supra note 113, at 116 
(making passing reference to “phasing or logically sequencing discovery, so that possible silver-
bullet issues can be identified to promote the acceleration of a resolution on the merits”). 
297. Kaplow, supra note 23, at 1180. 
298. Id. at 1186–87. 
299. Id. at 1223–24. 
300. Id. at 1225. 
301. Stevenson, supra note 291, at 228–35 (summarizing literature). 
302. Moore, supra note 278, at 236; John P. Rowley III & Richard G. Moore, Bifurcation of 
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of trial, at which point it becomes phased.  Figure 1 depicts traditional 
bifurcated trials: 
 
FIGURE 1: Bifurcated Trials 
 
 By contrast, in addition to separate trials for separate issues, staged 
litigation phases discovery and other litigation activities into different 
stages for different issues.  Figure 2 depicts staged litigation: 
 
FIGURE 2: Staged Litigation 
 
Civil Trials, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 19 (2010). 
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To the extent that phasing of discovery and other activities already 
occurs in civil litigation, it is most commonly just to encourage 
settlement or determine the relevance of additional discovery, not to 
also promote phased resolution.303  Truly staged litigation—with 
discovery, resolution, and all other activities phased by issue—remains 
rare, despite the significant attention paid to bifurcated trials. 
The narrow focus on bifurcated trials, rather than fully staged 
litigation, is somewhat surprising.  Trial only occurs in a small 
percentage of civil litigation,304 so any benefits from bifurcated trials 
are trivial compared to the potential benefits of completely staged 
litigation.305  Or perhaps it is not surprising.  Staged litigation is 
contrary to the American vision of “the trial as a discrete and dramatic 
event rather than a series of interviews conducted over an extended 
period.”306  As a result, courts presume unitary litigation and trial and 
impose a heavy burden to depart from this norm.307  Moreover, staged 
litigation is not ideal from either plaintiffs’ or defendants’ perspective, 
even if it may be socially optimal.  Plaintiffs benefit from the in 
terrorem effect of unitary discovery and trials,308 and plaintiffs’ interests 
 
303. See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, A Process Model and Agenda for Civil Justice Reforms in 
the States, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1553, 1566–67 (1994) (describing phased discovery where the most 
important discovery occurs first but without also discussing phased resolution). 
304. Jonathan D. Glater, Study Finds Settling is Better Than Going to Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
7, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/08/business/08law.html?_r=0. 
305. See Kaplow, supra note 23, at 1227 (“First, attention is often devoted to the conduct of 
trial whereas much of the savings may be at the pretrial phase, notably, the conduct of discovery 
in the context of U.S. civil litigation.”). 
306. Carrington, supra note 263, at 2070. 
307. See, e.g., F & G Scrolling Mouse, L.L.C. v. IBM Corp., 190 F.R.D. 385, 387 (M.D.N.C. 
1999) (“[T]he bifurcation of issues and the separate trial of them is not the usual course of events.  
Nothing else appearing, a single trial will be more expedient and efficient.  The party requesting 
separate trials bears the burden . . . .” (citing Industrias Metalicas Marva, Inc. v. Lausell, 172 
F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.P.R. 1997); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 160 F.R.D. 30, 35 (D. Del. 1995); 
Smith v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 538 F. Supp. 977 (D. Del. 1982); Brad Ragan, Inc. v. 
Shrader’s Inc., 89 F.R.D. 548, 550 (S.D. Ohio 1981))). 
308. Because defendants tend to have more discoverable information than plaintiffs, the costs 
of unitary discovery tend to give plaintiffs more leverage in settlement.  See JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 12, at apps. B-40 to -41 (“Some cases involve what often is 
called ‘information asymmetry.’  One party—often an individual plaintiff—may have very little 
discoverable information.  The other party may have vast amounts of information . . . .  In 
practice these circumstances often mean that the burden of responding to discovery lies heavier 
on the party who has more information, and properly so.”).  Similarly, juries are generally 
perceived as pro-plaintiff (perhaps incorrectly).  See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries by 
Comparison to Judges: A Benchmark for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469, 469–70 (2005) 
(stating that “[t]he popular view is that juries are pro-plaintiff decisionmaking bodies” but noting 
empirical research questioning the popular view).  Moreover, a unitary trial ensures that the 
injured plaintiff will be able to tell the jury of its injuries, which may sway jury outcomes.  
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see any deviation from the litigation system created in 1938 as favoring 
defendants.309  Defendants’ interests, by contrast, are more concerned 
with mitigating the broad substantive rights and doctrines of the modern 
American legal system than with designing a litigation procedure that 
faithfully enforces substantive law in the most efficient way.310 
3.  Staging Patent Litigation 
Staged litigation seems particularly promising in patent cases.  The 
most logical staging of patent litigation would involve an initial phase 
for liability issues (infringement and invalidity) and a second phase for 
damages and willfulness.311  The core liability issues of infringement 
and invalidity are the issues with the greatest likelihood to terminate the 
case without the need for further proceedings because a finding of 
noninfringement or invalidity conclusively resolves the case.  At the 
same time, as Part III showed, they are also the issues with lower 
discovery costs, at least as compared to remedial patent issues.  In 
Kaplow’s terminology, patent liability issues of infringement and 
invalidity have a very high diagnosticity/cost ratio.  Moreover, 
infringement and invalidity are generally distinct from remedial issues 
and subject to different proof using different witnesses (fact and expert) 
and documents.312  As a result, the synergy costs of staging patent 
litigation would be fairly low.  Thus, patent litigation seems like a 
natural candidate for staged litigation, with infringement and invalidity 
conclusively resolved before any discovery or other litigation occurs on 
remedial issues.313 
It is not unusual in patent litigation to bifurcate trials between 
 
Stevenson, supra note 291, at 228–31. 
309. See Miller, supra note 292, at 366 (“It should be obvious that [recent] procedural stop 
signs primarily further the interests of defendants, particularly those who are repeat players in the 
civil justice arena—large businesses and governmental entities.”). 
310. See Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on 
Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 610 (2010) (suggesting that defendants’ efforts at discovery 
reform are primarily about avoiding substantive rules and regulations). 
311. For substantive reasons, other commentators have suggested staging invalidity and 
infringement.  See Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. 
REV. 71, 119–22 (2013) (arguing litigating invalidity before infringement will eliminate more 
“bad” patents).  This section focuses on staging liability and remedial issues because it offers the 
greatest potential for reducing discovery costs, the focus of current patent reform efforts. 
312. See Scrolling Mouse, 190 F.R.D. at 387–88 (“[L]iability and damages are [not] so 
inextricably interwoven that separation will render both trials unfair because of confusion and 
uncertainty.” (citing Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 415 (5th Cir. 1964))). 
313. Early voluntary or mandatory disclosure of limited financial information may be useful 
to promoting settlement.  Provided this is limited to basic finances like units sold and revenues, 
rather than the full panoply of information relevant to the reasonable royalty, it poses little threat 
to the efficiencies of staged litigation. 
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liability and damages/willfulness.314  And this is normally the division 
proposed in the occasional case where fully staged litigation is 
requested.315  But fully staged patent litigation is virtually unheard 
of.316  A staged patent case would start as most cases do under patent 
local rules.  The parties would exchange contentions on infringement 
and invalidity, as well as technical documents about the conception and 
reduction to practice of the invention, the structure and operation of the 
accused product, and the allegedly invalidating prior art.317  Claim 
construction would occur approximately one year after filing.318  
Because the necessary technical documents would have already been 
exchanged, liability issues could then be ready for trial in an additional 
seven to eight months.319  Thus, liability issues would be ready for trial 
approximately 600 days from filing.  By comparison, the normal time to 
trial in busy patent districts is nearly a year longer.320  If liability is 
established, a period of fact discovery (e.g., six months), expert 
discovery (e.g., two months), and motions and pretrial proceedings 
(e.g., six months) would be required on remedial issues.  The total time 
from filing to complete trial, even with staged litigation, would be 
approximately 1025 days, not significantly more than the present norm 
 
314. See Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 160 F.R.D. 30, 33 (D. Del. 1995) (“Historically, 
courts have found it worthwhile to hold separate trials on liability and damage issues in patent 
cases.”). 
315. See id. at 31–32 (describing defendant’s motion for separate trials on liability and 
damages/willfulness and to stay discovery on damages/willfulness until after liability trial). 
316. Moore, supra note 278, at 236 (“In short, when bifurcation is granted, it is bifurcation of 
the trials only, not discovery.”).  By contrast, staging patent litigation between liability and 
damages (“quantification”) is the norm in Canada.  See Model Bifurcation Order, Fed. Ct. of 
Can., http://cas-ncr-nter03.cas-satj.gc.ca/portal/page/portal/fc_cf_en/Notices (model order for 
bifurcating litigation of liability and damages). 
317. See, e.g., N.D. Cal. Pat. R. 3-1 to 4 (providing a process for exchange of infringement 
and invalidity contentions and technical documents). 
318. Under the patent local rules adopted in many districts, claim construction is ready for 
resolution within six months of the case management conference.  See, e.g., N.D. Cal. Pat. R. 3-1 
to 4-6 (requiring infringement contentions fourteen days after case management conference, 
invalidity contentions forty-five days after infringement contentions, joint claim construction 
chart and hearing statement sixty days after invalidity contentions, opening claim construction 
brief forty-five days after joint claim construction chart, responsive claim construction brief 
fourteen days after opening brief, reply claim construction brief seven days after responsive brief, 
and claim construction hearing two weeks after reply brief). 
319. An efficient, but reasonable, schedule is as follows: From the claim construction order, 
thirty days for opening expert reports; fourteen days for rebuttal expert reports; fourteen days for 
expert depositions; fourteen days for dispositive motions to be filed; thirty days from filing of 
dispositive motions to hearing; thirty days from hearing to resolution of dispositive motions; sixty 
days from resolution of dispositive motions to the pre-trial conference; thirty days from the pre-
trial conference to trial. 
320. Daniel M. Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling 33 (July 6, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Southern California Law Review). 
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of 938 days.321 
If any of the more discovery-intensive technical issues are raised, the 
stages may need to be designed differently.  For example, if the accused 
infringer disputed that it made, sold, offered for sale, used, or imported 
the accused product in the United States during the patent term, the 
technical issues could still be resolved first to reach a decision as to 
whether the accused product satisfied the claim limitations.322  Then the 
question of whether the requisite act was committed in the United States 
could be decided either in an intermediate stage or as part of the 
remedial stage.  A similar approach could apply in cases with indirect 
infringement allegations, with the question of whether the product at 
issue meets the claim limitations decided in the first phase and the 
question of requisite knowledge and intent being decided in a later 
stage. 
Secondary considerations of nonobviousness pose the greatest 
obstacle to staged patent litigation.  These can be discovery intensive, 
but they also are difficult to separate from the technical issues.  Doing 
so could create Seventh Amendment problems because the two are 
tightly intertwined: the purpose of secondary considerations is to rebut 
the prima facie case of obviousness.323  Additional discovery narrowly 
tailored to the secondary considerations issue could be allowed in the 
technical stage.  Because such evidence also may be relevant to 
damages, there could be some limited duplication from such an 
approach.  However, since any documents, interrogatories, and 
admissions provided on secondary considerations could also be used in 
the remedial phase without additional effort, the duplication would be 
limited to, at most, depositions of a few witnesses.  It is doubtful this 
limited potential duplication outweighs the benefits of staged litigation.  
Alternatively, secondary considerations discovery could be postponed 
until after dispositive motions occur in the technical phase.  The prima 
facie case of obviousness could be first tested via summary judgment 
motion before undertaking limited secondary considerations discovery. 
Staged patent litigation offers significant benefits in patent cases 
similar to in other types of litigation, like reducing costs, 
disincentivizing weak claims, and encouraging resolution on the 
merits.324  Moreover, patent trials have been criticized for focusing on 
 
321. Id. 
322. Alternatively, if the act of infringement issue is significant, it could be addressed in a 
first stage before reaching the technical issues. 
323. See infra Part IV.C.4. 
324. The lack of resolution on the merits may be more problematic in patent cases than other 
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ancillary issues, like narratives of the “good” inventor versus the “bad” 
copier, rather than on core technical issues.  By focusing the first stage 
just on technical issues not amenable to these sort of ancillary issues, 
staged litigation can promote fidelity to the technical merits of the 
patent and prior art. 
4.  Staged Litigation Beyond Patent Litigation 
Civil litigation is at a crossroads.  Commentators recognize that civil 
litigation has entered a new era that departs from strict adherence to the 
values and system embodied in the 1938 enactment of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.325  Procedural reforms “favor[] increasingly early 
case disposition in the name of efficiency, economy, and avoidance of 
abusive and meritless lawsuits” and “retreat from the principles of 
citizen access, private enforcement of public policies, and equality of 
litigant treatment in favor of corporate interests and concentrated 
wealth.”326  However, rather than embrace the new era in civil litigation 
and debate how to design reforms that still preserve other values like 
access to courts, many commentators instead bemoan any departure 
from the Federal Rules’ procedural system.327 
Yet, procedural reform is inevitable.  “The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure were promulgated in 1938, and, needless to say, things are 
much different today than they were then.”328  The intervening years 
“have witnessed the most extraordinary growth in federal and state 
substantive law in this country’s history,” dramatically increasing the 
total amount of litigation in federal courts.329  Moreover, litigation 
today tends to be exponentially more complex in terms of subject 
matter, legal doctrine, number of parties, number of claims, and cross-
border interactions.330  This complexity implicates a far wider range of 
information and sources of information.  The corporations that tend to 
 
cases.  See generally Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67 VAND. 
L. REV. 375 (2014) (arguing that settlement of patent cases sometimes is against the public 
interest because it fails to eradicate invalid patents). 
325. Subrin & Main, supra note 65, at 1856. 
326. Miller, supra note 113, at 10. 
327. Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal 
Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1234–
36 (2008) (describing the majority of academic commentary as “traditionalist,” and objecting to 
litigation reforms simply because they depart from the principles of the 1938 enactment of the 
Federal Rules). 
328. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Twombly and Iqbal Reconsidered, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1621, 
1630 (2012). 
329. Miller, supra note 292, at 292. 
330. Id. at 290–91. 
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be defendants also are bigger and more complex, making it more costly 
and difficult to find all information in their possession that might relate 
to the case.331  Finally, due to the rise of computers, electronic 
documents, and electronic communications, people today create and 
retain dramatically greater volumes of information than in 1938.332  In 
light of all these changes, “[i]t is not surprising” that reforms would be 
needed.333  Even if one is unwilling to accept that procedural reform is 
necessary, it is hard to dispute that procedural reform is inevitable given 
the political influence of the large corporate interests most burdened by 
the broad 1938 procedural system.334 
As even Professor Miller, one of the staunchest defenders of the old 
procedural system, has recognized, the real task is to “reconcile the 
continuing viability of the values of 1938 with the realities of 2010, and 
find a way to uphold the principle of access and the other policy 
objectives underlying the original Rules while adjusting to 
contemporary litigation conditions.”335  Commentators have begun to 
suggest such ways to reform civil litigation, while preserving other 
values like access to courts, including a “simple case track” for federal 
district courts,336 some form of discovery cost shifting,337 and an 
enhanced motion for a more definite statement under Federal Rule 
12(e).338 
The example of patent litigation suggests that staged litigation may 
be a promising alternative.  As discussed above, it addresses the primary 
concerns motivating modern procedural reforms like the Federal Rules 
amendments and the heightened pleading requirements of Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly339 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,340 namely that “the threat of 
discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even 
anemic cases before reaching those proceedings.”341  The dissent in 
Twombly even noted the possibility of something similar to staged 
 
331. Fitzpatrick, supra note 328, at 1638. 
332. Id. 
333. Id. at 1634. 
334. See Miller, supra note 292, at 366–67 (“I think it is fair to say that a number of the 
Justices (as well as other federal judges) have a predilection (perhaps subliminal) that favors 
business and governmental interests.”). 
335. Miller, supra note 113, at 104. 
336. Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a 
Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 409–12 (2011). 
337. Fitzpatrick, supra note 328, at 1644–46. 
338. Miller, supra note 113, at 104. 
339. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
340. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
341. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559. 
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litigation: “a plan of ‘phased discovery’ limited to the existence of the 
alleged conspiracy and class certification.”342  Similarly, a few 
commentators have suggested a procedure resembling a limited form of 
staged litigation in response to Twombly and Iqbal: “[G]ive the plaintiff 
a chance to conduct limited discovery before deciding a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim or a motion for a more definite 
statement.”343 
Staged litigation avoids the problems identified with the Federal 
Rules amendments, the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, and other recent 
efforts to reform civil litigation: burdening meritorious claims, 
perversely denying plaintiffs discovery of the information they need to 
establish the merits of their claims, undermining the benefits of trial by 
jury, and applying indiscriminately even to non-mega cases where there 
is no cost problem.344  Staged litigation targets cost savings at the least 
meritorious claims that offer no societal benefits to offset the 
deadweight loss imposed by litigation costs.  Discovery is limited to one 
or a few issues, preferably less discovery-intensive issues, until the 
plaintiff demonstrates a meritorious case by prevailing on the initial 
issue(s).  As a result, the most expensive discovery is saved for the most 
meritorious cases (as demonstrated by resolution of the initial issues), 
where it is most needed to insure optimal deterrence, compensation, or 
other substantive objectives.  However, before the merits are evaluated, 
plaintiffs are given full discovery on the issue(s) to be resolved in the 
first stage, insuring that they have the information necessary to 
demonstrate their claim is meritorious.  Moreover, staged litigation does 
not require any artificial decision about whether the claim is meritorious 
enough to proceed, a decision that is likely to be subjective and 
unpredictable.345  Rather, the merits are screened using the normal 
means for determining the merits of a claim, including trial by jury if 
appropriate. 
In sum, staged litigation preserves the values many deem important 
about the 1938 procedural system, including liberal discovery and trial 
 
342. Id. at 593 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
343. Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 
IOWA L. REV. 873, 933 (2009). 
344. See Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 879–81 (2010) (criticizing Iqbal based on the 
burden on meritorious cases and the denial of information needed to establish merits); Miller, 
supra note 292, at 306 (criticizing recent procedural reforms for undermining adjudication on the 
merits and trial by jury); Comments by Professors Helen Hershkoff et al., supra note 78 
(criticizing discovery reforms based on the burden on meritorious cases and the application to 
non-mega cases where no discovery problem exists). 
345. Spencer, supra note 284, at 1733. 
REILLY (179-245).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2015  5:15 PM 
240 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  47 
by jury.  What it alters is when the plaintiff can get liberal discovery and 
trial by jury.  Rather than giving every plaintiff who files a complaint 
full discovery and a complete resolution by trial, staged litigation 
rations these expensive procedures, allowing the plaintiff discovery and 
resolution on a few limited issues first but then requiring some proof of 
a meritorious claim—by prevailing on the initial issues—before 
allowing the remainder of discovery and resolution.  Finally, staged 
litigation necessarily must be tailored for different substantive areas and 
more or less staging can be used as appropriate in light of the cost and 
complexity of litigation in different substantive areas.  In fact, some 
substantive areas—or cases of certain stakes—might have just a single 
“stage” indistinguishable from unitary litigation.346 
Whether staged litigation ultimately proves to be an optimal reform 
in areas other than patent litigation will require careful analysis of the 
issues and evidence in various substantive areas, an analysis that is 
beyond the scope of this Article.  This will depend on whether some 
issues are case dispositive, whether the potentially case-dispositive 
issues are also low-discovery issues, and to what extent there is overlap 
between discovery needed for case-dispositive or low-discovery issues 
and discovery needed for other issues.347   
It is certainly possible that patent litigation will prove to be an outlier 
in this regard.  Perhaps patent litigation is unique in that the most 
intensive discovery issues (damages and willfulness) can be separated 
from, and resolved after, less discovery-intensive, but potentially 
dispositive, issues (infringement and invalidity).  That is, perhaps staged 
litigation is a unique solution only applicable to patent litigation to the 
common discovery problem faced in patent litigation and other mega 
cases.  Such a unique solution to a common problem might warrant 
treating patent litigation differently than other civil litigation, i.e., patent 
exceptionalism.  Yet, given the increasing focus on balancing the need 
to reduce discovery costs with the need to maintain access to courts and 
the promising potential of staged litigation in this regard, staged 
litigation’s potential in other areas of law is certainly worth exploring 
 
346. For example, social security cases are 6% of the federal civil docket.  See U.S. COURTS, 
supra note 98, at tbl.C-2 (listing 303,820 total civil cases filed in twelve months ending March 
31, 2014, 19,636 of which were social security cases).  These cases are unlikely to require 
significant discovery and instead are likely to be resolvable on the administrative record.  
Similarly, consumer credit cases are 3% of the federal civil docket and also are unlikely to require 
significant discovery.  Id. (listing 8,480 consumer credit cases).  Staged litigation would offer 
little benefit in these types of cases. 
347. Cf. Kaplow, supra note 23, at 1223–28 (examining factors for determining whether 
multistage adjudication is warranted). 
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before consigning it only to patent litigation. 
5.  Implementing Staged Litigation 
Staged litigation already lies within judges’ discretion and can be 
imposed even if neither plaintiffs nor defendants are necessarily 
enthusiastic.348  In theory, judges should use their discretion to impose 
staged litigation in cases where it is warranted and deny staged litigation 
when its costs exceed its benefits.  Yet, judges almost never implement 
staged litigation.349  To some extent, this is because judges share the 
American predilection for trial as a singular, dramatic event.350  But 
judges also seem to overvalue their personal self-interest, emphasizing 
the need for multiple hearings and trials in staged litigation, and 
undervalue the savings that would occur for other aspects of litigation 
where the judge is not present, such as discovery.351  Finally, judges 
demonstrate a (perhaps unsurprising) narrow focus on the case at hand, 
rather than taking a more general or systemic perspective.  For example, 
judges refuse to weigh the possibility that the defendant will prevail in 
the first stage, thereby eliminating the need for further discovery and 
litigation, because they do not have enough information to evaluate the 
merits in the specific case.352  In doing so, they overlook that, 
statistically, defendants will prevail in a significant percentage of 
cases.353 
Judges’ resistance to staged litigation provides an important lesson.  
If staged litigation is left to individual judges’ discretion, their self-
 
348. Rowley & Moore, supra note 302, at 18. 
349. F & G Scrolling Mouse, L.L.C. v. IBM Corp., 190 F.R.D. 385, 387 (M.D.N.C. 1999) 
(“[T]he bifurcation of issues and the separate trial of them is not the usual course of events.”). 
350. See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. James River Corp. of Va., 131 F.R.D. 607, 608 (N.D. Ga. 
1989) (quoting Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1323–24 (5th 
Cir. 1976)) (“In considering such a course, the court should remain mindful of the traditional rule 
of the factfinder; i.e., to make an ultimate determination on the basis of a case presented in its 
entirety. . . .  [B]ifurcation works an infringement on such an important aspect of the judicial 
process . . . .”) 
351. See, e.g., Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 160 F.R.D. 30, 35 (D. Del. 1995) 
(emphasizing efficiency of one trial while giving limited consideration to efficiency in nontrial 
portions of the litigation). 
352. See, e.g., Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 834, 840 (N.D. Ill. 
2006) (“Although defendants’ argument that separate trials would promote judicial economy if 
defendants prevail, is true, they have not demonstrated that such success is likely.”); Johns 
Hopkins, 160 F.R.D. at 35 (“[T]he court is not in a position to fairly evaluate CellPro’s claim that 
there is a substantial probability it will prevail on liability.”). 
353. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending 
Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1136 (1992) (providing plaintiff trial win rates by 
category of cases and showing that plaintiffs generally win in only one-half to two-thirds of 
cases). 
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interest or narrow focus will undermine the potential systemic benefits.  
For staged litigation to be most effective, it must be mandated or 
otherwise imposed at a systemic level.  District judge discretion could 
be maintained but guided in favor of staged litigation by flipping the 
presumption in favor of staged litigation, with exceptions in only 
limited, defined situations, such as when the amount in controversy is 
below a certain threshold, the type of case is particularly routine or 
simple, or other strong justifications exist for unitary proceedings. 
Alternatively, staged litigation could be mandated for certain issues 
in certain types of cases.354  Neither Congress nor the Judicial 
Conference can reasonably be expected to have the substantive 
expertise necessary to do so.  Instead, Congress or the Judicial 
Conference could provide the basic framework and empower 
committees with substantive expertise in specific subjects and 
representing diverse interests—plaintiffs, defendants, judges, and 
academics—to develop presumptive or mandatory staging plans for 
different types of cases.  Similar committees have been used quite 
successfully to develop local rules for structuring patent cases in a 
variety of districts, and these rules are widely seen as evenhanded and 
beneficial.355  The committees’ plans would identify the various issues, 
the order of resolution, and exceptions to applicability of the staging 
order.  This approach would offer a transsubstantive framework to solve 
problems that span subject matters but would maximize the 
effectiveness of the framework by tailoring it to the nature and needs of 
different areas. 
While part of the resistance to staged litigation is simply self-interest 
or irrational commitment to the “dramatic” trial, three legitimate, but 
ultimately misguided, concerns require further consideration.  First, 
staged litigation is said to increase costs through duplication if the case 
is not terminated in the first phase.356  This argument understates the 
likelihood that the case will be terminated at the end of the first phase.  
 
354. Cf. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-1-4.1 (2015) (“In any claim alleging punitive or 
exemplary damages, before any discovery relating thereto may be commenced and before any 
such claim may be submitted to the finder of fact, the court shall find, after a hearing and based 
upon clear and convincing evidence, that there is a reasonable basis to believe that there has been 
willful, wanton or malicious conduct on the part of the party claimed against.”). 
355. See, e.g., Kennelly & Manzo, supra note 230 (describing widespread demand for and 
acceptance of patent local rules). 
356. See, e.g., Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 218 F.R.D. 387, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(quoting Remcor Prods. Co. v. Servend Int’l, Inc., No. 93 C 1823, 1994 WL 594723, at *1 (N.D. 
Ill. Oct. 28, 1994)) (“Rather than furthering convenience and judicial economy, separate trials 
would result in duplication of effort due to the overlapping evidence required to establish both 
liability and willfulness.”). 
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Even if only one-third of cases are resolved in the first phase, the 
amount of duplication that must occur in the other two-thirds of cases 
will have to be substantial to offset the savings from eliminating any 
further activities in the terminated third.  Moreover, the early resolution 
of a key, dispositive issue in the plaintiffs’ favor may reduce 
divergences in the parties’ expected outcomes, promoting settlements 
that otherwise would not occur and generating additional savings.  And 
carefully drawn staging plans can minimize the amount of duplication.  
Ultimately, staged litigation’s effect on costs will depend on the issues 
involved, how intertwined or severable they are, and whether less 
discovery-intensive issues are case dispositive and capable of being 
litigated before other issues.  These considerations demonstrate the need 
for staging plans that vary among substantive areas. 
Second, and relatedly, staged litigation is said to increase the length 
of litigation in contravention of the Federal Rules’ goal of speedy 
resolution.357  This argument assumes that the first stage of litigation 
will take as long to complete as unitary litigation and therefore any 
second stage will necessarily prolong the litigation.  However, because 
staged litigation is more focused, the first stage can reach resolution 
quicker than unitary litigation.  As a result, staged litigation will be 
quicker than unitary litigation in the significant proportion of cases in 
which the defendant prevails on the first issue.  And early resolution of 
a key, potentially dispositive issue in the plaintiffs’ favor should 
promote settlements after the first stage that would not occur in unitary 
litigation.  Even cases that proceed through all stages may not take 
much longer than unitary litigation, though the time would be 
apportioned differently.358  Rather than a long discovery period, a long 
pretrial period, and a long trial, there would be multiple shorter 
discovery, pretrial, and trial periods.  Thus, while litigation may take 
longer in some staged cases, there is little reason to think that either 
cumulative or average per-case litigation time will increase.359 
Third, the Seventh Amendment is an oft-cited obstacle to any form of 
nonunitary litigation.  The Seventh Amendment provides that “no fact 
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the 
 
357. See, e.g., Johns Hopkins, 160 F.R.D. at 35 (“A single trial followed by an appeal is the 
best procedure for the court to follow in working to achieve our goal under the Civil Justice 
Reform Act of resolving litigation within eighteen months after the filing of the complaint.”). 
358. Cf. Steven S. Gensler, Bifurcation Unbound, 75 WASH. L. REV. 705, 720 (2000) 
(describing a 1960s study of bifurcated trials finding that multiple split trials were no longer, and 
perhaps shorter, than unitary trials). 
359. Cf. id. at 706–07 (arguing that trial bifurcation will generally shorten litigation). 
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United States.”360  The Seventh Amendment issue is largely a red 
herring.  “The criteria is not whether the same evidence is presented at 
both trials, but rather whether the same essential issues will be 
decided.”361  Thus, as long as staged litigation is designed to insure the 
issues in the separate stages are truly distinct and separable, even if 
some evidence may be common, the Seventh Amendment does not bar 
staged litigation.362  Alternatively, the same jury could be recalled at 
multiple phases of a trial.363 
Given the limited attention truly staged litigation has received in 
American jurisprudence, these potential obstacles have largely been 
discussed in the context of bifurcated trials.  Other concerns have also 
been raised in that context that might apply to truly staged litigation, 
including that nonunitary resolution leads to more defense verdicts, 
prevents jurors from reaching “compromise” verdicts that impose 
liability but low damages, and takes issues out of their full context.364  
Resolution of these arguments largely depends on one’s view of the 
appropriate substantive outcome or role of the jury.  But, importantly, 
whatever the validity of these “costs” in evaluating bifurcated trials, the 
analysis is different for truly staged litigation.  Because the potential 
benefits of staged litigation are so much greater than bifurcated trials—
both cumulatively (vastly more cases reach discovery than trial) and 
individually (staged litigation saves both discovery and trial costs)—any 
problems with staged litigation must be substantially greater than with 
bifurcated trials to make the procedure not cost justified. 
CONCLUSION 
Too often, patent litigation is treated as a unique area of law distinct 
from general civil litigation.  This “patent exceptionalism” has been 
criticized for causing patent litigation to ignore the lessons and 
doctrines developed in other areas of law.  This Article demonstrates a 
 
360. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
361. F & G Scrolling Mouse, L.L.C. v. IBM Corp., 190 F.R.D. 385, 388 (M.D.N.C. 1999). 
362. Edward F. Sherman, Segmenting Aggregate Litigation: Initiatives and Impediments for 
Reshaping the Trial Process, 25 REV. LITIG. 691, 704 (2006) (“Although there may be some 
overlapping of evidence in different segments of a bifurcated case, courts have generally found 
that such issues as liability, damages, causation, and affirmative defenses satisfy the ‘distinct and 
separable’ test, and there is no violation of the Seventh Amendment.”).  The second jury can be 
instructed to accept the results of the first jury. 
363. For jurors, it is probably preferable to have to appear for two or three mini-trials (e.g., 
two to three days) over a period of months or years than to be absent from their jobs, families, or 
responsibilities for two or more straight weeks.  Multiple alternate jurors can be used to mitigate 
the risk that one or two jurors will be lost in the time between phases. 
364. Stevenson, supra note 301, at 228–35 (summarizing literature). 
REILLY (179-245).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2015  5:15 PM 
2015] Linking Patent & Civil Litigation Reform 245 
second problem with “patent exceptionalism”: the lessons of patent 
litigation are ignored in debates over how to structure and improve civil 
litigation generally. 
Both of these problems are evident in discovery reform.  Patent 
reform efforts assume that patent discovery is uniquely problematic—
whether due to its supposedly disproportionate costs or the abuses of 
patent assertion entities—and therefore in need of patent-specific 
solutions.  Civil litigation reform ignores patent litigation, even though 
it offers a perfect example of the complex, high stakes cases widely 
acknowledged as having problematic discovery. 
Linking patent discovery reform with general civil discovery reform 
is productive.  Looking carefully at the discovery problems in patent 
litigation, and their causes, suggests a solution with potential benefits 
well beyond patent cases: staged litigation.  To date, staged litigation 
has remained on the fringes of American procedure because it 
challenges the trial as a singular, dramatic event.  But it is the most 
promising way to reduce the costs of litigation while maintaining other 
values deemed important, like access to information and the jury trial.  
If we are committed to these values, as well as the broad substantive 
rights and broad substantive doctrines of modern America, then staged 
litigation may be the only, or best, hope for making litigation more 
efficient.  Viewed this way, the continued commitment to the trial as 
singular, dramatic event seems irrational, naïve, and antiquated. 
Staged litigation is one example of the need to rethink the way 
litigation is structured to confront the realities of modern litigation.  
Through joinder and preclusion rules, the American system encourages 
the bundling of issues into a single case.  But the commitment to the 
trial as a singular, dramatic event then forces these bundled issues into 
unitary resolution.  This has proven problematic as American society, 
business, and litigation become increasingly complex. 
